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1 Introduction
Many countries have instated programs promoting entrepreneurship as policymakers have
been increasingly acknowledging their potential virtues asActive LaborMarket Policies (ALMP).
This subject has found a large echo in the academic literature, but two important issues have so
far drawn little attention: (i) the existence of a distortion arising from the current unemployment
insurance (UI) system favoring the search for paid-employment rather than self-employment
and, (ii) the related question of insuring the downside risk inherent to any entrepreneurial activ-
ity as a means to reduce the above distortion. By enforcing the requirements that unemployed
individuals are available for work and actively searching for a job in order to obtain regular
benefits, many UI programs implicitly prevent the pursuit of an entrepreneurial project. At the
same time, the downside risk, defined as the risk supported by an entrepreneur on her income
stream because of bad performances, is a stark reality. The potential insurance of this risk is
subject to a trade-o : on the one hand, this risk could be an important selection mechanism
of the ablest entrepreneurs. On the other hand, it could prevent many potentially successful
individuals from engaging in an entrepreneurial activity. The papers by Hombert et al. (2017),
Ejrnæs and Hochguertel (2014) and Caliendo and Künn (2011) have paved the way for empiri-
cally addressing this trade-o . The policy discussed in Hombert et al. (2017) maintains the UI
rights of unemployed individuals when they start a business in order to alleviate the e ects of
adverse business shocks. Implementing such a reform is a step towards reducing the distortion
arising from prevalent UI systems. However, addressing these issues first require a proper rep-
resentation of endogenous occupational choices and the associated flows between occupations.
The main contribution of this paper is thus to build a rich theoretical framework encompassing
entrepreneurship and detailed occupational flows. To support this objective, we start by docu-
menting a number of empirical facts about entrepreneurship and the labor market focusing on
these flows. Our second contribution is to use our model to assess the interaction between UI
and entrepreneurship, with a special focus on recently implemented entrepreneurial assistance
programs. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to tackle this agenda.
The basic building block of our economy is an incomplete markets general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous agents, occupational choices, risky entrepreneurship and search fric-
tions. Agents can be employed in a corporate sector, self-employed or unemployed. Employed
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agents face an unemployment risk and can search for a business idea on-the-job in order to be-
come self-employed. Unemployed agents can either search for a job or an entrepreneurial idea.
Self-employed agents, also referred to as entrepreneurs, can search for a corporate job on-the-
business. They might experience an adverse shock to their business productivity, leading them
to potentially default on a previously contracted debt. Importantly, they have to decide how
much to invest in their activity before knowing this shock. Finally, the government runs a tax-
financed UI program. In our baseline economy, entrepreneurs that fall out of business cannot
claim UI rights. All the ingredients above are crucial for our purpose: financial frictions, sav-
ings, and heterogenous abilities create a quantitatively credible framework to address our policy
questions. Labor market frictions are key to reproducing the necessity self-employment, which
is the pool of low earning entrepreneurs that would be better o  in a corporate job, in order to
avoid considering only the ablest entrepreneurs.
We use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to characterize occupational flows between
paid-employment, unemployment, and entrepreneurship in our baseline economy. Using edu-
cation or wages in the data and ability in the model and with a parsimonious set of assumptions,
we capture most of the shapes of these flows, namely the hump-shape of the flow from unem-
ployment to employment, the decreasing shapes from employment to unemployment and en-
trepreneurship to unemployment, the increasing shape between unemployment and entrepreneur-
ship and the increasing part of the flow from entrepreneurship to employment.1 We also capture
the high entrepreneurial exit rate into paid-employment and show that unemployed individuals
are four times more likely to start a business than employed individuals. In contrast to the ex-
isting literature, we obtain these flows while scarcely using exogenous elements: for instance,
we do not impose exogenous entrepreneurial exit. The model is also able to match a number of
other entrepreneurial or individual characteristics found in the CPS and the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF): the relative wealth between occupations, entrepreneurial earnings (including
the zero or negative earnings fraction) or the fraction of people starting a business out of ne-
cessity. Our resulting entrepreneurial survival rate is consistent with the data, both in terms of
magnitude and in replicating the large exit rate of young entrepreneurs and the low exit rate of
older ones.
1We target the flow from employment to entrepreneurship by earnings quantiles and impose a decreasing job
destruction rate with respect to ability.
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A crucial attribute of an entrepreneur is the idiosyncratic and possibly fundamental risk
associatedwith her activity. In recent years, an increasing number of ALMPs inOECDcountries
have been providing financial assistance to unemployed individuals in order to help them start
a business. These policies are referred to as Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) programs and
target the risk faced by unemployed individuals when creating a business. Broadly speaking,
a first class of SEA programs provides assistance to unemployed individuals in the form of
monetary grants, loan guarantees or training, somewhat independently of the UI system. A
second class extends the UI system to cover part of the entrepreneurial risk. This last class
of policies can be type dependent when they rest on previous labor earnings and individual
productivity and even business income dependent when the assistance is contingent on business
outcomes. In the US, a type dependent policy called the Self-Employment Assistance Program
(SEAP) waives regular UI beneficiaries from active job search and dispense an allowance of the
same amount and duration as regular benefits, provided they engage in the establishment of a
business. However, this policy is only active in less than ten states and is constrained by quotas.
In Europe, a number of countries experimented SEA programs in the last decades. Hombert
et al. (2017) describe a 2002 French type and business income dependent policy called Plan
d’Aide au Retour à l’Emploi (PARE), that introduced a form of SEA designed to insure the
downside risk: eligible entrepreneurs could use their UI benefits to bridge the gap between the
original amount of benefits and their business income.2 Moreover, in the first three years after
starting their businesses, they could also keep claiming their UI rights in case of failure. These
authors estimate an increase of 12% of the number of newly created firms after this reform while
the pool of entrepreneurs and their relative performances are unchanged.3
We extend our baseline economy to evaluate this second class of SEA policies. Our reference
SEA policy mirrors the French type and business dependent program and includes two main
mechanisms. First, upon business failure, eligible entrepreneurs can return to unemployment
2Only formerly unemployed individuals with UI rights are eligible.
3Related papers on European SEA policies include Ejrnæs and Hochguertel (2014) who use a Danish retirement
reform incorporating entrepreneurial UI to study the e ects of a downside risk insurance. They find that entry into
entrepreneurship increases by 1.2 - 1.8% and that entrepreneurs are not any di erent in terms of performances.
Caliendo and Künn (2011) estimate the e ects of two di erent German programs helping unemployed individuals
to start businesses. In the first program, individuals were given a lump-sum startup subsidy each month for three
years, with the amount declining every year. Under the alternative bridging allowance (BA) program, individu-
als received their unemployment benefits for six months. The authors find that under the two experiments, new
entrepreneurs tend to be less qualified, but are more qualified under the BA than under the start-up subsidy.
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and claim UI benefits. Second, operating eligible entrepreneurs are given partial insurance
in the form of a supplementary income covering poor business outcomes.4 In comparative
experiments, we study the e ect of alternative SEA mechanisms found in policies implemented
in various countries, such as non type dependency and non business income dependency. We
find that all the SEA programs we study have important mobility e ects. With our reference
policy, the share of entrepreneurs increases by 1.5% and the fraction of unemployed individuals
starting businesses rises by 11% as compared to the no policy baseline economy. In contrast to
the previous literature that focuses on partial equilibrium, we do not find a significant e ect of
SEA programs on the unemployment rate but rather find that employment in the corporate sector
is crowded out. Concerning unemployed individuals who would have entered entrepreneurship
even in the absence of the policy, we show that eligible entrepreneurs survive longer, but invest
and produce slightly less due to moral hazard e ects. For those who entered because of the
policy, a type dependent SEA program selects more skilled and richer new entrepreneurs, who
therefore invest more than those selected under a non type dependent SEA providing a lump-sum
compensation. After decomposing the reference SEA into components, we argue that the single
mechanism of allowing business-starting unemployed individuals to return to the unemployment
pool at some point and keep claiming their outstanding UI rights would significantly reduce the
bias towards paid-employment of current UI systems at virtually no extra cost for the economy.
Interestingly, all the reforms generate positive levels of steady-state welfare. However, relatively
poor and unskilled individuals with low UI rights are borrowing constrained and do not benefit
from the reform. At the same time, the predominant corporate workers support the costs of
the policies. As a consequence, the welfare along the transition is on average negative, albeit
only slightly, and around 30-40% of the individuals benefit from the reforms. Finally, we show
that the design of the UI system itself and the level of entrepreneurship is tightly linked. A
more generous UI system has a negative e ect on the propensity of becoming an entrepreneur:
increasing UI benefits and/or extending UI duration imply a lower incentive for unemployed
agents to start a business, amplified by the rising opportunity costs of abandoning their status.
This adverse e ect can significantly be mitigated using a SEA program and even reverted in the
case of an increase in the UI duration.
4This income is subject to a specific rule depending on previous UI benefits. A third auxiliary mechanism can
be activated to provide an extra income even in case of better outcomes. These privileges are all temporary.
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Related literature There is a substantial literature on entrepreneurship and many papers are
concerned about the impact of existing barriers to entrepreneurship on the share of entrepreneurs
in the economy. A number of contributions such as Landier and Thesmar (2008), Schoar (2010)
or Hurst and Pugsley (2011) show that only focusing on this share might prevent us from under-
standing the vast amount of heterogeneity in the entrepreneurial pool and the rich composition
or selection e ects underneath. Our specification is able to capture a number of those e ects:
we, for instance, highlight a high quarterly flow from entrepreneurship to paid-employment.
While this latter finding is not new (see for instance Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) at a yearly fre-
quency), our model generates this flow as the result of only endogenous decisions. The recent
literature introduces a distinction between entrepreneurs starting a business out-of-necessity and
out-of-opportunity in order to understand the choice of becoming entrepreneurs with respect to
the working ability (Poschke (2013)). Our model theoretically characterizes the related notion
of necessity share, and show how insurance mechanisms a ect its magnitude. This paper is also
related to the quantitative literature on entrepreneurship in relation with mobility and wealth in-
equality issues pioneered for instance by Quadrini (2000) or Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and to
the many policy questions that have been addressed using this framework (Kitao (2008), Cagetti
and De Nardi (2009) and Buera and Shin (2013) among others). Similarly to our contribution,
some recent papers have begun addressing the question of insurance mechanisms in models with
entrepreneurship. This literature has mainly focused on the e ects of introducing health insur-
ance (Fairlie, Kapur and Gates (2011)) or alternative bankruptcy laws (Mankart and Rodano
(2015)) on the fraction of entrepreneurs and their performances.
While many papers often argue that improving entrepreneurial conditions could be a way
to reduce unemployment (for instance, Caliendo and Künn (2011) or Thurik et al. (2008)), our
results mitigate this argument based on entrepreneurial insurance. Some authors (Evans and
Leighton (1989), Thurik et al. (2008), Røed and Skogstrøm (2013) among others) have studied
the relationship between unemployment and UI benefits and the probability to start a business.
In this respect our paper is closest to Hombert et al. (2017) and Ejrnæs and Hochguertel (2014),
although their contributions are mostly empirical and use partial equilibrium models. To the
best of our knowledge, none of these contributions have raised the question of entrepreneurial
insurance or that of the distortive e ect of the UI system in a general equilibrium model, espe-
cially one with realistic occupational flows.
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The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical facts con-
cerning entrepreneurship and occupational flows. Our baseline model is developed in section
3 and our parameterization in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the properties of our baseline
economy while our policy experiments are conducted in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized facts and definitions
In this section, we first clarify our notion of entrepreneurship and highlight the potential
relationship between entrepreneurial risk and business start-up rate. We hint at how assistance
programs and insurance mechanisms could foster entrepreneurship, most notably for unem-
ployed individuals. Second, we document a number of empirical facts about occupational flows
in the US that motivate our modeling choices.
2.1 Entrepreneurship and risk
Definitions The definitions of an entrepreneur in the literature take into account three main
dimensions: the self-employment status, business ownership, and the active management status.
Depending on the definition and the survey used, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the US varies
from 7% to 11%. Surveys such as the SCF or CPS contain questions that let an individual
define himself as self-employed according to her own perception. In this paper, we use the CPS
to compute both the masses in each occupation and the corresponding flows between them.5
We define an entrepreneur as a self-employed individual owning her business.6 According to
this definition, from 2001 to 2008, we find an average fraction of entrepreneurs of 9.4%. In the
SCF, over the 2001, 2004 and 2007 waves, the corresponding number is 8.8%.7
Entrepreneurship and risk perception Using the 2007 SCF, we find substantial risks asso-
ciated with entrepreneurial income: considering only income filed as business revenues, about
20% of the entrepreneurs report having zero or negative income. This number falls to 3% when
5We restrict our sample to the period from 2001 to 2008 and consider only the 20-65 old population. Ratios
are computed with respect to the total number of entrepreneurs, unemployed individuals, and workers. Section B
of the online appendix details our sample selection approach and additional details.
6Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) define an entrepreneur as a self-employed individual owning her business and
actively managing it in the PSID. Unfortunately, we cannot control for an active management role in the CPS.
7Section B of the online appendix summarizes our reference SCF moments. We define an entrepreneur as a
self-employed individual holding a positive share of their businesses in order to be consistent with our definition
in the CPS.
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we account for entrepreneurial income filed as wages plus business revenues.8 This corroborates
the findings in Herranz, Krasa and Villamil (2015) about income risks: they report that in a year,
about 12% of the Survey of Small Business Finances firms losemore than 20% of assets invested
in the firm (debt plus equity), 7.4% more than 40%, and 3.8% more than 100%. Similarly, us-
ing the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Hamilton (2000) finds that 10% of
self-employed reports zero or negative earnings. Furthermore, we find that entrepreneurial in-
come is not distributed normally but is rather extremely right-skewed.9 Most entrepreneurs are
concentrated below and around the median income but some of them perform extremely well
while others have negative incomes. Whether we consider business or total income, the main
idea is that there are potentially important risks associated with an entrepreneurial occupation.
In particular, the entrepreneurial earnings distribution displays a much higher variance than the
distribution for employees.
Finally, using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project for 28 coun-
tries, Arenius and Minniti (2005) find that perceptual variables, such as alertness to opportu-
nities, fear of failure, and confidence in one’s own skills are significantly correlated with new
business creation across all countries.10 The above evidence on perceived risk as a barrier to
entry into entrepreneurship is an argument for the fact that insurance provision could foster
entrepreneurship by lowering entrepreneurial risk.
Unemployment insurance (UI) and entrepreneurship In almost every state in the US, un-
employed individuals lose their unemployment benefits when starting a business.11 Contrast-
ingly, a number of OECD countries and a small number of US states have or had a SEA pro-
gram in place, encouraging the pursuit of an entrepreneurial activity while unemployed. When
available, SEA programs constitute one of the largest entrepreneurial subsidies. In France, the
8We distinguish between business income and wage plus business income because a number of entrepreneurs
file their earnings either as wage or as business income. We also normalize incomes by the median entrepreneurial
income. There are two main problems arising in most of the survey. First, entrepreneurial earnings are bottom-
coded. Second, as argued by Astebro and Chen (2014), entrepreneurial earnings can be under-reported. In the end,
SCF data concerning negative (due to loan repayment and interests, salary to employees and per-period variable
and fixed costs) and zero income have to be taken with caution.
9We plot this distribution in section A of the online appendix using SCF data.
10We report in section A of the online appendix a figure that shows that the decline in the self-employment rate
in the US since the 2000s is associated with an increase in the fear of failure index.
11For instance, in Pennsylvania, section 402(h) of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law states
that "a claimant is ineligible for any week in which he/she is engaged in self-employment. When a claimant is start-
ing a new business, the claimant becomes self-employed with the first positive step toward starting the business".
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PARE reform concerns almost 50% of all new entrepreneurs (Hombert et al. (2017)). In Ger-
many, between 2002 and 2011, around 40-50% of new entrepreneurs per year received this type
of insurance. Concerning their implementation, some SEA policies are said to be type depen-
dent with benefits tied to an agent’s ability and calculated on the base of previous earnings. A
non type dependent SEA, however, provides periodic lump-sum amounts irrespectively of UI
benefits. Existing SEA programs can also be distinguished along the following dimensions. A
first set of SEA programs is business income dependent and provides UI benefits only when
eligible entrepreneurs experience bad outcomes. A second set allows eligible entrepreneurs to
terminate their business activity and recover outstanding UI benefits as an unemployed agent.
Table 1 provides a non-exhaustive overview of SEA programs around the world.12
Type dependent
policy
Business income
dependent policy
UI rights if
failure
Countries
Yes Yes Yes France ACCRE (1998-2006), France ARE (2008-), Fin-
land (current), The Netherlands (current)
Yes No Yes Ireland BTWEA (1999-), US SEAP (1998-) Sweden Self-
employment Grants, Germany Bridging Allowance (1986-
2006), Germany new start-up subsidy (2006-)
Yes No - Canada SEA (1993-), Hungary SEA
No No Yes Finland Start-up Grant (1988-), UK EAS (1983-1991)
No No No Australia NEIS (1985-), Denmark EAS (1989-1994)
Germany start-up subsidy (2003-2006), UK NEA (2010-)
Table. 1. Types of Self-employment Assistance programs around the world.
Financial frictions In the incomplete markets literature with entrepreneurship, the presence
of borrowing constraints is documented (by Quadrini (2000) among others) and is used to gen-
erate heterogeneous firm sizes. The ability to borrow is essential for a business venture. Ac-
cording to Mankart and Rodano (2015), of the total credit backed by some real collateral, about
80% is backed by some business assets.13 But this ability can be damaged by the past history
of defaults. Personal bankruptcy can be made under Chapter 7 (liquidation bankruptcy) and
Chapter 13 (repayment reorganization bankruptcy), with the former accounting for 70% of total
bankruptcy cases. Bankruptcy filing remains public information for ten years: this can exclude
a potential entrepreneur from borrowing for a significant amount of time.
12It should be noted that the rules regulating these programs are in the details more complex than the simplified
classification we provide here. Much of the complexity comes from the fact that many programs are entangled
with other unemployment assistance programs.
13This includes inventory, account receivables, vehicles or other business equipment, business securities or
deposits and business real estate.
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2.2 Occupational flows
We now document a number of empirical features of quarterly flows between occupations
based on CPS data. Many of these flows have not been detailed in the literature and they consti-
tute important factual elements for our modeling choices and calibration. Cagetti and De Nardi
(2009) target a high annual entrepreneurship exit rate of about 22% in the US. With a di erent
but related measure of entrepreneurship, we find a consistent quarterly entrepreneurship exit
rate of 6%, with roughly 1% toward unemployment. As shown in Table 2, if we consider the
whole population of self-employed individuals14, the corresponding number is close to 7.5%.
This exit rate is much higher than the 1% to 3% of entrepreneurs filing for bankruptcy each
year, corresponding to 0.25% to 0.75% each quarter. This suggests that many entrepreneurs
voluntary quit their businesses for a job.
Transition (%) Mass (%)
Employment Entrepreneurship Unemployment
A. Self-employed business owner
Employment 97.35 (0.36) 0.50 (0.09) 2.15 (0.34) 85.2
Entrepreneurship 4.80 (0.82) 94.22 (0.89) 0.99 (0.34) 9.4
Unemployment 47.36 (5.86) 2.40 (0.88) 50.25 (6.0) 5.4
B. All self-employed
Employment 97.20 (0.36) 0.69 (0.1) 2.11 (0.34) 84.3
Entrepreneurship 6.15 (0.93) 92.45 (1.0) 1.40 (0.40) 10.3
Unemployment 46.04 (5.87) 3.72 (1.13) 50.25 (6.0) 5.4
Table. 2. Flows between occupations for di erent definitions of entrepreneurship per quarter (std. devi-
ations between braces). Data sources: authors’ own computations using CPS data from 2001 to 2008.
On the entry side, roughly 2.4% of the unemployed individuals and 0.5% of the workers
start a business each quarter. If we consider the whole self-employed population, these num-
bers rise respectively to 3.7% and 0.7%. We find that unemployed individuals are 4 to 5 times
more likely to enter entrepreneurship than workers. Concerning the flow from employment to
entrepreneurship, we document a U-shaped relation with respect to earning quintiles in Table 3.
We find that high earning (and potentially high skill) and low earning (and potentially low skill)
workers tend to start their own businesses more often than the average worker. It is arguable that
high earners tend to be more talented for running valuable businesses, making self-employment
a better alternative than employment for those individuals. Similarly, low earning workers can
14This grouping comes from individual replies to the CPS survey questions across people clearly mentioning
being self-employed and a business owner and people generally declaring being self-employed.
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view entrepreneurship as a way to improve their standards of living. Contrastingly, for average
(and potentially mid-skill) earners, entrepreneurship seems to be a less viable alternative when
compared to paid employment.
% of workers switching to Quintile Mean
[0:20] [20:40] [40:60] [60:80] [80:100]
A. Self-employment & business owner 0.68 0.38 0.44 0.41 0.61 0.50
(0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
B. Self-employment 1.05 0.61 0.62 0.54 0.75 0.69
(0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
Table. 3. Flows from employment to entrepreneurship by earning quintiles per quarter (std. deviations
between braces). Data sources: authors’ own computations using CPS data from 2001 to 2008.
Figure 1 gives a general picture of the shape of the flows between occupations with respect
to educational attainment15 (and for flows out of employment with respect to wage quintile).
One striking feature is that the > C : higher college and professional school group can have
a substantially di erent behavior with respect to other college graduates. This finding is quite
recurrent and one explanation is the fact that this group has a less uniform definition in the data
when compared to all the other groups (with the exception of maybe < HS: less than a high
school degree group at the other extreme). The U-shape described above for the employment
to entrepreneurship flow by earnings persists with respect to educational attainment when tak-
ing into account only self-employment.16 We also find that other flow profiles are non-linear,
such as the entrepreneurship to worker flow that displays a S shape. Specifically, less educated
entrepreneurs have a high flow out of entrepreneurship, reflecting potentially their higher risk
of failure. Then as more educated groups can find high income and less risky paid jobs, the
profile becomes increasing again. The S-shape is created by the > C group that displays a
very low disposition to quit entrepreneurship that mirrors the very high disposition of the same
group to leave paid employment for entrepreneurship. We surmise that on top of education,
other characteristics might explain this behavior, making this group especially prone to becom-
ing and remaining entrepreneurs. We point out that the patterns above are robust to others time
frames. We also obtain similar shapes when we exclude mobility toward and from part-time
15Educational attainment is divided between: < HS : less than a high school degree, H: high school degree,
< C : some college but no degree, B : bachelor’s degree,M: master’s degree,> C : higher college and professional
school degrees.
16In section A of the online appendix, we show that this flow with respect to education for any definition of
entrepreneurship is U-shaped at the longer 2001-2015 horizon.
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jobs (fewer than 20 hours of work per week)17 and if we control for individual characteristics.18
In the end, what these flows show is that observing only aggregate occupational mobility might
not be enough. The skill or ability of an individual, that we can not directly measure in the
CPS data, could be an important determinant of mobility. Flows by education or income show
significant non-linearities that should be captured in a model. On this subject, Poschke (2013)
shows theoretically that a correlation between working ability and the opportunity of setting-up
a valuable business can replicate the observed masses of self-employed workers among di er-
ent ability groups (measured in terms of education). We stress that financial frictions are also
an important requirement to generate heterogeneous entrepreneurship decisions within ability
groups. We, therefore, build our model on the two minimal dimensions of individual capital
and skill levels.
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Figure 1. Quarterly occupational flows by educational attainment (black, top horizontal axis) and wage
earnings (blue, bottom horizontal axis). The solid lines (resp. dashed lines) refer to self-employed busi-
ness owners (resp. self-employment only). Legend: U: unemployment, W : paid-employment, E : en-
trepreneurship. In grey: confidence interval for the mean at a 95% confidence level. Data sources:
authors’ own computations using CPS data from 2001 to 2008.
17These alternative flows are reported in the online appendix section A. In detail, we compute quarterly flows
for the alternative period 2008-2015, quarterly flows for 2001-2008 selecting only full-time occupation and yearly
flows for 2001-2008. We find that the patterns of the flows shown above are robust.
18Results of a linear probability model on the probability to exit a given occupation reveal similar shapes relative
to educational attainment.
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3 Model
In this section, we describe a Bewley - Huggett - Aiyagari type general equilibrium model in
incomplete markets, with occupational choices in the spirit of Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). We
extend the latter paper by introducing risky entrepreneurial investment choices, occupational
search frictions and the possibility to default in equilibrium. Our model accounts for a baseline
economy and alternatives ones under various SEA programs, as it is our main policy concern.
3.1 Corporate sector
Our economy has two production sectors: a corporate one presented here and an entrepreneurial
one discussed later. The corporate output Y is produced by a single competitive representative
firm using a Cobb-Douglas technology, with total factor productivityA, capital levelK and labor
L, such that: Y = F (K , L) = AK↵L1 ↵, where ↵ 2 (0, 1) is the capital share. There is no ag-
gregate uncertainty. Profit maximization produces the competitive prices: r = A↵
⇣
L
K
⌘1 ↵    
and w = A(1   ↵)
⇣
K
L
⌘↵
, with w and r the wage and interest rates, which by a no arbitrage
condition are identical in the entrepreneurial sector, and   the depreciation rate in both sectors.
3.2 Households
Occupations and preferences The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived
households of unit mass. Every period, a household falls in one of three occupations o 2
O ⌘ {oe , ow , ou}: entrepreneurship (oe); unemployment (ou); or employment (ow ) (worker in
the corporate sector). An agent’s occupation can change either exogenously or endogenously.
Agents derive utility from consumption and disutility from search. The life-time utility of a
household is given by E0
P1
t=0  
tu(c , se , sw ), with c the consumption, se and sw respectively
business and job search e orts, and   the discount factor. We assume that labor is supplied
inelastically. We denote a 2 A the agent’s wealth. Any wealth saved in the model pays the
deposit rate rd , with rd = r    . The competitive interest rate r can thus be interpreted as a
lending rate and   as a wedge between the lending rate and the deposit rate.
Insurance status Depending on their previous occupation, agents can either be insured (j = i)
or uninsured (j = n). In the baseline economy, only a worker falling in involuntary unemploy-
ment (i.e. when laid o ) can claim any insurance in the form of a standard UI. In the alternative
economy subject to a specific policy discussed below, eligible entrepreneurs are also insured
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during their entrepreneurial endeavor. Section 3.6 describes this policy in details.
Exclusion status Entrepreneurs can borrow from a creditor subject to an endogenous interest
rate and use these amounts in their entrepreneurial venture.19 However, an agent who has de-
faulted in the past is excluded temporarily from the credit market. Such an agent cannot borrow
and is labeled constrained, with credit flag e = C , but can still start a business. Following
Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Mankart and Rodano (2015), we model exclusion in a probabilistic
way. Upon recovering access to credit, her credit flag is e = A.
Exogenous processes The exogenous states of an agent are summarized by (✓, y , z 1) and
we assume that the three associated processes are AR(1) with orthogonal innovations. All in-
dividuals are endowed with a persistent component of individual productivity ✓ 2 ⇥ that we
call ability. This component is initially determined according to the invariant distribution ⇧✓
and then evolves at a very slow rate.20 We stress that a working household’s labor income,
an unemployed individual’s replacement income and an entrepreneurial household’s business
income all depend on this component. Workers are subject to an additional persistent idiosyn-
cratic shock y 2 Y on their labor income that we call match-quality.21 If an agent was not a
worker in the previous period, she does not know her match-quality before receiving a job o er.
In that case, this shock in initialized by drawing it from the invariant distribution ⇧y associated
with the process for y . Otherwise, both individual productivity and match-quality shocks are
realized at the beginning of the period before agents take any decision. Entrepreneurs face a
within-period persistent idiosyncratic business shock z 2 Z . Contrastingly to the other shocks,
only its previous value z 1 is known at the beginning of the period, and the current shock is
realized within the period after entrepreneurs have decided on their business investment. An
individual not currently running a business, but starting one next period will initialize her shock
z according to the invariant distribution ⇧z associated with the process for z .22
19The exact nature of the credit contract is explained in section 3.5.1.
20We allow individual productivity to evolve in order to generate additional saving motives. Our model does not
take into account life-cycle aspects, human capital accumulation at work, technological progress or health risks.
Those elements can explain a large productivity dispersion along the life-cycle, but are unaccounted for here.
21This model does not include an explicit matching process but y can be viewed as a match-quality component
because it starts and ends with a specific job while not appearing as a state for the unemployed or the entrepreneur.
Adding this process brings our earnings distribution closer to reality but our results are insensitive to it.
22We assume that z is observed only after experimenting the business idea. In our model as in the reality, an
important fraction of new entrepreneurs experiments a business and exit if the project is not profitable enough.
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Value functions We denote x = (a, y , ✓, z , j , e) the full state vector of households over all oc-
cupations. We will sometimes use a subset xo for a specific occupation o. We noteW the value
function associated with a worker, U with an unemployed individual and E an entrepreneur.
Future value functions are respectively denoted: W 0 = W (a0, ✓0, y 0, e 0), U 0j 0 = U(a0, ✓0, e 0, j 0)
and E 0j 0 = E (a0, ✓0, z , e 0, j 0). Finally, eligible unemployed individuals benefit from the en-
trepreneurial insurance. The value of being a new entrepreneur while uninsured is given by
E 0n = z [E (a0, ✓0, z , e 0, j = n)]. The value E 0i of being a new insured entrepreneur depends
on the economy considered.23 We specify this value in section 3.6. Note that in section C of
the online appendix, we write a more detailed version of model equations, explicitly including
transition probabilities that we omit below for readability.
3.3 Workers
In the corporate sector, a worker receives the labor income h(✓)yw , where the function
h : ✓ 7! transforms the individual productivity component into working ability. She has a
probability ⌘(✓) of getting laid o , depending on her individual productivity. In such a case,
she falls in insured unemployment and can expect to get value U 0i .24 To finance UI benefits, a
worker pays a proportional tax ⌧w on their labor income. By providing e ort se , a worker can
search for a business idea on-the-job and start a business in the next period with probability
⇡e(se).25 She then voluntary exits her current occupation, cannot claim UI benefits (i.e., j = n)
and can expect to get value E 0n. If she gets laid o  at the same time as getting a business idea,
she can claim UI rights and start a business with value E 0i , which depends on the policy status:
no insurance in the baseline case or entrepreneurial insurance otherwise. To simplify notations,
let us denote ⌘ ⌘ ⌘(✓) and ⇡e ⌘ ⇡e(se). The recursive formulation of a worker is given by:
W (a, ✓, y , e) = max
c>0,a0 0,
se 0
u(c , 0, se) +  Ee0,y 0,✓0|e,y ,✓
n
(1  ⌘)⇥(1  ⇡e)W 0 + ⇡e max{E 0n,W 0}⇤ (1)
+ ⌘
⇥
(1  ⇡e)U 0i + ⇡e max{E 0i ,U 0i }
⇤o
23We denote this value with the subscript i even if no insurance policy is currently in place in the baseline model.
The subscript can thus be interpreted as access to insurance in the alternative economy.
24Notice that in our model, value functions associated with unemployment are always lower than those associated
to a worker. Therefore, we exclude any voluntary switch to unemployment. Conversely, an unemployed agent
getting a job opportunity always exits.
25Business search e ort can describe market research on the feasibility of an idea, competition assessment,
business education, agency costs or the time needed to fill administrative forms, validate product norms, etc.
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s.t. c = (1  ⌧w )h(✓)wy + (1 + rd)a  a0 (2)
where equation (2) is the worker’s budget constraint.26
3.4 Unemployed individual
We assume that all unemployed individuals are endowed each period with a fixed amount
m, that can be interpreted as domestic production. An unemployed individual can either claim
UI (j = i) or not (j = n). Insured unemployed agents receive UI benefits proportional to their
individual productivity, with replacement rate µ and lose UI rights with probability ⇢. An unin-
sured unemployed individual cannot claim any UI benefits and remains uninsured until finding a
job. Unemployed agents search for a business idea and a job opportunity with respective e orts
se and sw and corresponding success probabilities ⇡e and ⇡w ⌘ ⇡w (sw ). Upon finding a job,
such an agent becomes a worker with valueW 0. Similarly, when getting an idea, a business can
be started in the next period. An insured agent (j 0 = i) do so with value E 0i , while an uninsured
agent (j 0 = n) will have value E 0n. Finally, exclusion from credit market evolves similarly to a
worker. The recursive program of an unemployed individual is:
U(a, ✓, e, j) = max
c>0,a0 0,
se 0,sw 0
u(c , sw , se)+ E✓0,y 0,j 0,e0|e,j ,✓
n
⇡w
⇥
(1  ⇡e)W 0 + ⇡e max{E 0j 0 ,W 0}
⇤
(3)
+ (1  ⇡w )
⇥
(1  ⇡e)U 0j 0 + ⇡e max{E 0j 0 ,U 0j 0}
⇤o
s.t. c = m + {j=i}(1  ⌧w )h(✓)wµ+ (1 + rd)a  a0 (4)
where equation (4) is the budget constraint.
3.5 Entrepreneurs
An entrepreneur raises revenues from her self-employed business venture. She decides to
invest an number of resources k , that can be either her own or borrowed, in a decreasing re-
turns to scale technology governed by the parameter ⌫ 2 (0, 1), before knowing the current
realization of the business shock z 2 Z . All entrepreneurs are subject to this within-period
idiosyncratic shock a ecting the firm’s productivity. Entrepreneurial activity also depend on
g(✓) where the function g : ✓ 7! transforms the individual productivity component into
26For simplicity, we assume that w already internalizes other taxes not related to the UI financing. Relaxing this
assumption would need to account for a more realistic set of taxes.
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entrepreneurial ability.27 The entrepreneurial technology is thus: f (k , ✓, z) = zg(✓)(k)⌫ . We
define entrepreneurial income as the entrepreneurial production net of capital depreciation and
any interest repayment on borrowed entrepreneurial capital. Moreover, by providing e ort sw ,
an entrepreneur can search for a job opportunity on-the-business and change occupation in the
next period with probability ⇡w . The sequence of choices an entrepreneur is facing is summa-
rized in Figure 2. We now detail this sequence.
Enter with
(a, ✓, z 1, j , e)
t
Investment and credit
{rb( ),k} if e=A
k if e=C
Shock z ,
production
Default decision
if e = A
Save a0 ,
search sw
New (✓0, j 0, e 0),
choose o
t + 1
Figure 2. Timing for an entrepreneur.
3.5.1 Non-excluded entrepreneur
When an entrepreneur has access to the credit market, she is allowed to borrow from a
financial intermediary an amount that can only be invested in her business. Recalling that a is
the agent’s current wealth, an entrepreneur chooses whether to borrow (k > a) or save (k < a).
If she borrows from a creditor the amount (k a), we assume that it is only up to a fixed fraction
  of their total assets.28 The entrepreneur decides the amount k invested in her firm in order to
maximize her expected value with respect to the shock z , as expressed below:
E (a, ✓, z 1, e = A, j) = max
k
nX
z2Z
⇡z(z |z 1)max{B(a, k , ✓, z , j),R(a, k , ✓, z , j)}
o
(5)
s.t. (k   a)   a (6)
The interior max operator in expression (5) corresponds to the choice the entrepreneur has to
make between bankruptcy (B) or repayment (R) options once the realization of the shock z is
known.
Repayment The standard behavior of a borrowing entrepreneur is to repay her loan after pro-
duction. In case of a bad shock, the entrepreneur will receive a low (possibly negative) en-
27g(✓) could reflect the fact that individuals with di erent abilities (i.e educational attainment for instance) runs
very di erent businesses.
28In principle, an entrepreneur could borrow an amount and then decide to invest none or only a part of it in
her business. Such behavior is excluded in this model. In that sense, the entrepreneur pledges the totality of her
business collateral amount a invested in her firm before borrowing any amount. Alternatively, we could introduce
an endogenous borrowing constraint as in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). However, this considerably increases the
computational time.
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trepreneurial income but can still decide to repay and thus not be excluded from the credit mar-
ket in future periods. If she repays, the entrepreneur also has to cover the endogenous interest
rb( ) on her loan. The associated recursive problem is:
R(a, k , ✓, z , j) = max
c>0,a0 0,
sw 0
u(c , sw , 0) +   E
✓0,y 0,j 0|✓,j
n
⇡w max{W 0,E 0j 0}+ (1  ⇡w )max{U 0j 0 ,E 0j 0}
o
(7)
s.t. c + a0 = ⇡Ar + {j=i}be(✓,⇡Ar ) + a+ rd(a  k) {ka} (8)
⇡Ar = zg(✓)(k)
⌫    k   rb( )(k   a) {k a} (9)
where equation (9) is the profit function defined as total production minus depreciation and
interest paid on debt. Equation (8) is the budget constraint. We emphasize that the baseline
economy is only populated with uninsured entrepreneurs. Contrastingly, there are two groups of
entrepreneurs in the alternative economy with SEA: the insured group (j = i) and the uninsured
group (j = n). We stress here for clarity that insured entrepreneurs might receive an additional
income be(✓, ⇡r ) on top of their current entrepreneurial income ⇡r . Thus this entrepreneur’s
consumption and saving decision depend on her total income and assets, composed of her en-
trepreneurial income, possible SEA benefits, interests on savings not invested in her company
for an amount rd(a   k) {ka} and personal assets a.29
Bankruptcy When an entrepreneur chooses not to repay the borrowed amount or the interests,
she defaults and goes bankrupts. Her firm is liquidated and her business idea is lost.30 We as-
sume, in the spirit of D’Erasmo and Boedo (2012), that after producing and observing her shock
z , an entrepreneur can choose to renegotiate what is due through a judicial action in a court.
Bankruptcy is characterized by the cost of the procedure   (including court fees and the cost
of insolvency practitioners), proportional to the invested business capital and the recovery rate
⇠ referring to the portion of the original loan that the creditor can recover.31 This portion cap-
tures what can be recovered using di erent channels, including liquidation and reorganization.
29To see this, recall that the cash on hand of such an entrepreneur in the baseline economy can be written:
zg(✓)(k)⌫ + (1   )k   (1 + rb( ))(k   a) {k a} + (1+ rd)(a  k) {ka}. Rearranging terms yield the profit
and household’s budget constraint equations.
30In that case, the entrepreneur has to exit entrepreneurship for at least one period: she can start searching for a
new business idea in the next period and create a new business the period after that.
31Unlike Mankart and Rodano (2015), we abstract from Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemptions, as we do not dis-
tinguish secured and unsecured debt. They generate default with an iid investment shock inducing large capital
losses. Here, we focus on productivity shocks impacting current profit. We, therefore, need a bankruptcy specifi-
cation that implies a higher default incentive. Despite this potential limitation, our specification is able to capture
the entrepreneur’s income distribution as shown in section 5, which is our major concern for our policy experiment
to be meaningful.
18
After defaulting, the entrepreneur is excluded temporarily from the credit market in subsequent
periods. The recursive formulation of such an entrepreneur is:
B(a, k , ✓, z , j) = max
c>0,a0 0,
sw 0
u(c , sw , 0) +  E✓0,y 0,j 0|✓,j
n
⇡wW
0 + (1  ⇡w )U 0j 0
o
(10)
s.t. c + a0 = max{(1   )k +min{⇡r , 0}  ⇠(k   a), 0}+ {j=i}be(✓, 0) (11)
⇡r = zg(✓)(k)
⌫    k (12)
where we assume that banks recover all the positive profit.32 In our alternative economy
with a SEA program, an insured but bankrupt entrepreneur can claim any outstanding UI rights
be(✓, 0). This is consistent with the current bankruptcy law: public benefits, including unem-
ployment compensation, are fully exempted from any debt recovery.
Credit contract Following the literature on entrepreneurial option to default, the interest rate
rb( ) on an entrepreneurial loan is chosen endogenously by the creditor. We assume the latter
has perfect information about the entrepreneur’s default probability based on the observable
characteristics   = (a, ✓, z 1, j).33 We also assume perfect competition and free entry in the
credit market. Thus, an entrepreneur with a zero default probability will pay the competitive
rate r . The creditor and the borrowing entrepreneur agree on the terms of the credit contract
{k  a, rb( , k)}, detailing the amount loaned and its cost. The interest rate applied to the loan
is set such that the creditor makes zero profit in expectation given the entrepreneur’s decision
to default on a specific loan. When the entrepreneur chooses not to repay the debt, the creditor
can recover a fraction ⇠ of the original loan (plus the positive profit). The zero profit condition
includes three elements: (i) the expected return in case of bankruptcy (VB), (ii) the expected
return in case of repayment (VR) and (iii) on the right hand side, the amount that the creditor
would get by investing the loaned amount in a project paying the safe interest rate of the economy,
such that:
VB + VR   (1 + rd +  )(k   a) (13)
32The entrepreneur starts the period with asset a, borrows (k   a) and uses k = a+ (k   a) in production. She
then pays depreciation  k and recovers k but decides to default on the borrowed amount. Thus her after production
asset is indeed k , but she has to pay all her positive profits, cost of bankruptcy  k and recovery ⇠(k   a). Creditor
preempting profit is an assumption ensuring a better reproduction of the default rate.
33We assume here that there is a su cient relation between the creditor (bank) and the entrepreneur. In particular,
we argue for instance that the creditor is able to observe enough elements (past entrepreneurial income, wage
income, etc.) about the entrepreneur to infer this value. Concerning the literature see, among others, Herranz,
Krasa and Villamil (2015), Mankart and Rodano (2015) or D’Erasmo and Boedo (2012).
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where VB and VR are given by:
VB =
X
z2B( )
⇡(z |z 1)
h
min
 
⇠(k   a), (1   )k +min{⇡r , 0}
 
+max{⇡r , 0}
i
(14)
VR =
X
z2Bc ( )
⇡(z |z 1)(1 + rb( ))(k   a) (15)
with B( ) the set of values z for a given state vector   for which the entrepreneur bankrupts
and Bc( ) is the complement for which she repays. Note that if the entrepreneur’s cash on hand
is too low and that ⇡r < 0, the creditor can only recover what the entrepreneur actually has, that
is, only the amount (1   )k + ⇡r .
Bankruptcy has several roles in this model. First, it prevents poor entrepreneurs from enter-
ing a credit contract because the charged interest rate would be too high for them to borrow. Sec-
ond, while the entrepreneur’s upper borrowing limit is identical between agents (k  (1+ )a),
the option to default generates di erent behavior among di erent ability group of entrepreneurs.
Finally, bankruptcy may interact with our policy experiments. In particular, the reforms could
modify the default incentive.34
3.5.2 Excluded entrepreneur
An entrepreneur excluded from the credit market runs her business using only her own
wealth. She has a probability   of reentering the credit market in the next period. Her recursive
program after the realization of the shock z is thus:
Eˆ (a, k , ✓, z , j) = max
c>0,a0 0,
sw 0
u(c , sw , 0) +  E✓0,y 0,j 0,e0|✓,j ,e=C
n
⇡w max{W 0,E 0j 0} (16)
+ (1  ⇡w )max{U 0j 0 ,E 0j 0}
o
s.t. c + a0 = ⇡Cr + {j=i}be(✓,⇡Cr ) + a+ rd(a  k) {ka} (17)
⇡Cr = zg(✓)(k)
⌫    k (18)
Therefore, the excluded entrepreneur decides the amount k invested in her firm in order to max-
imize her expected value with respect to the shock z, as expressed below:
E (a, ✓, z 1, e = C , j) = max
k2[0,a]
nX
z2Z
⇡(z |z 1)Eˆ (a, k , ✓, z , j)
o
(19)
34In section G of the online appendix, we show that bankruptcy as we model it does not alter our qualitative
results, but slightly impact their magnitude.
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3.6 Policy reforms: insurance and entry subsidy
We now detail the Self Employment Assistance (SEA) reform that extends the baseline
economy. This policy only concerns eligible agents: formerly unemployed individuals with
outstanding UI rights. We recall that an entrepreneur entering this programs after a period of
unemployment is expected to have a future value E 0i as an entrepreneur. Depending on whether
the reform is implemented, we define this value using the indicator  :
E 0i = z
⇥
(1  )E (a0, ✓0, z , e 0, j = n)| {z }
baseline
+ E (a0, ✓0, z , e 0, j = i)| {z }
SEA reform
⇤
(20)
where  = 0 defines the baseline economy and  = 1 the reformed economy.
SEA reform The major policy reform we introduce is a type dependent entrepreneurial in-
surance in the spirit of entrepreneurial policies active in France, Germany, and some US states.
An eligible entrepreneur entering this program will continue to benefit from her UI rights, even
after starting a business activity. The UI provision will depend on the realized entrepreneurial
income. Specifically, the additional amount be(✓, ⇡r ) is given to the entrepreneur, depending on
her current entrepreneurial income ⇡r and the UI benefits she could have claimed as an unem-
ployed individual. When the entrepreneurial income is negative (i.e., ⇡r < 0), an entrepreneur
can fully claim her unemployment benefits. Otherwise, the UI supplement diminishes propor-
tionally with the realized entrepreneurial income. The policy is characterized with the couple of
parameters (f , q¯), where f 2 [0, 1] is a downside risk insurance (DRI) replacement parameter35
and q¯ the maximum insurance duration. The rule governing be(✓, ⇡r ) is given by:
be(✓,⇡r ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
b(✓) if ⇡r < 0
b(✓)  (1  f )⇡r if 0  ⇡r  b(✓)1 f
0 if ⇡r > b(✓)1 f
(21)
where b(✓) = (1  ⌧w )h(✓)wµ is the full UI benefit that the entrepreneur could have claimed if
she was only unemployed. Figure 3 illustrates this policy with an example. The higher the f , the
higher is the amount of insurance provided in case of a positive but low profit. Moreover, the
higher the f , the higher is the fraction of entrepreneurs insured. Indeed, the maximum level of
entrepreneurial income ⇡r for which some UI benefits are provided is equal to b(✓)1 f . By increas-
35f lets the entrepreneur’s income be larger than her UI payment, but the compensation be(✓,⇡r ) cannot exceed
her UI rights. Even when f = 0, the insurance is e ective as shown later.
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ing the DRI parameter f , entrepreneurial incomes are covered up to a higher threshold value.
Therefore the insurance mechanism displays three regions: (i) a supplement that guarantees at
least the UI benefits if the entrepreneurial income is positive but low; (ii) an insurance-subsidy
which provides an additional supplement even if the entrepreneurial income is greater than the
UI benefits; and (iii) in case of a negative entrepreneurial income the full extent of the UI bene-
fit. On top of the above, our benchmark SEA scheme lets the insured entrepreneur return to the
unemployment pool and keep claiming her outstanding UI benefits.
0
-1
1
⇡r
⇡r
⇡r + be(✓, ⇡r )
b(✓) 1-1
b(✓)
b(✓)
1 f
b(✓)
1 f 0
be(✓, ⇡r ) = max{0, b(✓)  (1  f )⇡r}be(✓, ⇡r ) = b(✓)
be(✓, ⇡r )
f = 1
Figure 3. SEA reform. The red (darkest) region corresponds to a minimal case where f = 0 (en-
trepreneur gets at least b(✓) when b(✓) > ⇡r > 0). Note that if current entrepreneurial income ⇡r < 0,
this zone will be the same whatever the value of f . The orange (lighter) zone refers to a case where
f = 0.3: entrepreneurs will get at least the red zone and the extra orange zone depending on their in-
come. The grey (lightest) zone is a case where f = 0.45. Finally, the white zone between the grey zone
and the upper dashed line is the case where f ! 1 (entrepreneur always gets b(✓)).
An unemployed individual starting a business and who does not use all her outstanding UI
in the form of SEA payments must keep her UI rights as long as they are unused. To model this
feature, we let the probabilistic policy duration q(⇡r ) vary endogenously with ⇡r , such that:
q(⇡r ) = q¯
be(✓,⇡r )
b(✓)
(22)
In particular, in the case where ⇡r > b(✓)1 f , the government does not provide any compensation,
be(✓, ⇡r ) = 0, and the probability q(⇡r ) equals zero, a lower bound: the entrepreneur keeps
all her remaining UI rights. Contrastingly, an entrepreneur with ⇡r < 0 will receive all of her
SEA payments and lose her rights with the upper bound probability q¯. When ⇡r 2 (0, b(✓)1 f ), this
probability, q(⇡r ), lies in (0, q¯), depending on the amount of compensation provided.
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3.7 Government
In all considered economies, the government runs an UI system that covers the pool of
short-term unemployed individuals. Under the reforms, the government extends the UI program
to unemployed individuals starting a business activity and finances the programs using labor
income taxes ⌧w .36 Total government revenues (T ) are (with a slight abuse of notations): T =R
xow ,u
⇣
⌧wh(✓)wy d (xow )+⌧wh(✓)wµd (xou)
⌘
, with xo and  (xo) respectively the individual’s
state vector and the mesure of individuals in occupation o. Total government expenditures G
are equal to distributed UI benefits plus the reform’s cost: G =
R
xou,e,eui
⇣
h(✓)µw d (xou) +
 be(✓, ⇡r ) d (xoie )
⌘
, where  (xoie ) is the measure of insured entrepreneurs coming from the
pool of unemployed individuals with outstanding UI rights.
3.8 Equilibrium
Given x = (a, y , ✓, z , j , e) 2 A ⇥ Y ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ Z ⇥ {i , n} ⇥ {A,C}, a stationary recursive
equilibrium in this economy consists of a set of value functionsW (x),U(x),E (x), policy rules
over asset holdings a0(x), consumption c(x), job search e ort sw (x), business search e ort se(x),
business investment k(x), bankruptcy decision, occupational choice, prices (r ,w 2 R), tax
parameters (⌧w 2 R) and a stationary measure over individuals  (x), such that:
(1) Given prices (r ,w) and tax ⌧w , the policy rules and value functions solve household indi-
vidual programs and the zero profit condition of competitive creditors is respected; (2) The wage
w and the interest rate r are equal to the marginal products of the respective production factor in
the corporate sector; (3) Goods and factor markets clear: (a) capital:
R
a0(x)d (x) = K + KE ,
with aggregate entrepreneurial capital KE =
R
k(xoe )d (xoe ), (b) the measure of corporate
workers
R
d (xow ) is equal to corporate labor demand; (4)  (x) is the stationary measure of
individuals induced by the decision rules and the exogenous Markov processes; (5) ⌧w balances
the government budget (T = G ).
This model has no analytical solution and must be solved numerically. We detail our numer-
ical implementation for this problem in section F of the online appendix.
36In France, the PARE entrepreneurial insurance program is an extension of the UI system and this insurance is
only available after contributing enough as a former worker.
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4 Parameterization
We parameterize the model to be consistent with key features on occupational mobility,
entrepreneurship and thewealth distribution in the US.We computemoments related tomobility
using the basic CPS from 2001 to 2008 and those related to the wealth distribution using SCF
2001, 2004 and 2007. The model period is the quarter.
4.1 Fixed parameters
Technology, preferences and demography The share of capital in the corporate production
function ↵ is set to 0.33. The depreciation rate   is set to 0.015. We use the following CRRA
and power functions to describe utility of consumption and disutility of search: u(c , sw , se) =
c1  
1     s ww   s ee . The coe cient of relative risk aversion   is set to 1.5 and  w and  e are
calibrated. Each period, a fraction ⇣ of individuals retires and is replaced by ⇣ unemployed
individuals without UI rights. ⇣ is set to 0.5%, corresponding to the average entry rate of young
individuals into the working population each quarter in the CPS.
Labor income processes and UI The labor income process has persistent components h(✓)
(individual labor productivity) and y (match-quality), each following an AR(1) process in logs.
We set the individual productivity component such that h(✓) = ✓ and the persistence ⇢✓ is
0.975, corresponding to 10 years in the model. The variance of the innovation of the individual
productivity process  2✓ is 0.24 and is chosen to generate a Gini index for the earnings distri-
bution of about 0.38, as in (Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)). For the match-quality, ⇢y is set to
0.75, corresponding to a persistence of about a year. The variance of the innovation  2y is set
to 0.0225. We document a linear relationship for the transition from employment to unemploy-
ment with respect to earnings using the CPS. We therefore specify the layo  probability ⌘ as a
linear function of the working ability h(✓), such that ⌘(✓) = ↵⌘ +  ⌘wh(✓), where ↵⌘ and  ⌘
are estimated. Earning quantiles are used as a proxy for wh(✓). Home production income m is
set to 0.04.37 The US Joint Federal-State Unemployment Compensation program, established
under the Social Security Act of 1935, provides regular UI benefits for 26 weeks. Additionally,
since 1993, the Federal-State Extended Benefits program extends the duration up to 20 weeks
in states with especially high unemployment. We choose the least generous UI duration and set
37By increasing the agent’s current income and lowering the incentive to search for either a job or a business
idea, this value helps to generate a realistic unemployment rate.
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the probability ⇢ of falling in uninsured unemployment to 0.5, corresponding to about 26 weeks
of benefits. The replacement rate µ is set to 0.4 according to Shimer (2005).38
Credit market The probability   of reentering the credit market after an exclusion is set to
4.2%, corresponding to a period of 6 years. The intermediation cost   translating the trans-
action cost banks face when lending is set to 0.4% per quarter, which is in the range of the
literature.39 The recovery rate of a bankrupt entrepreneur is set to 77% of the capital invested in
the firm, according to data from the World Bank 2009 Doing Business report. The bankruptcy
cost  , however, is calibrated endogenously to generate a realistic default rate. Finally, we set
the maximum leverage ratio   to 50% following Kitao (2008).
Parameter Symbol Value Parameter Symbol Value
Capital share ↵ 0.33 Home production m 0.04
Depreciation rate   0.015 UI replacement rate µ 0.4
Relative risk aversion   1.5 UI duration ⇢ 0.5
Match-quality persistence ⇢y 0.75 Bankruptcy recovery rate ⇠ 0.77
Match-quality variance  2y 0.0225 Maximum leverage ratio   0.5
Individual productivity persistence ⇢✓ 0.975 Credit market wedge   0.004
Individual productivity variance  2✓ 0.24 Probability of reentering credit market   0.042
Fraction retiring ⇣ 0.005 Layo  rates (in %) ⌘(✓) 3.2, 2.2, 1.2
TFP A 1
Table. 4. Fixed parameters
4.2 Endogenously calibrated parameters and targeted moments
Entrepreneurial abilities The literature does not provide clear indications as to how en-
trepreneurial abilities evolve over time. The estimation procedure for such abilities is challeng-
ing since: (1) the contribution of the entrepreneur’s skills to the business returns is generally un-
observable; and (2) entrepreneurial income could be the sum of di erent income sources (busi-
ness income, wage or capital income). Some authors, for instance, Kitao (2008), parameterize
this ability using the entrepreneur’s income Gini. However, this assumes that entrepreneurial
and working abilities are uncorrelated. We instead stress that working and entrepreneurial abil-
ities are correlated and can generate the observed U-shaped relationship in the transition from
paid-employment to entrepreneurship by earning quantiles. We use this relation to indirectly
infer the mapping between working and entrepreneurial individual productivity. To do so, we
38In section 6.3, we study policy e ects under various UI systems with longer durations and higher benefits.
39For instance, Mankart and Rodano (2015) set a wedge of 1% for secured debt and 4% for unsecured debt.
Bassetto, Cagetti and De Nardi (2015) report a spread of about 1.5% annually (i.e. 0.37% quarterly).
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divide the labor income distribution into 3 quantiles and compute in each the ratio of workers
starting a business over the average ratio of workers starting a business in the economy. This
measure tells us how likely is a worker in a given quantile to start a business as compared to the
average worker. Depending on the period and the definition considered, we find that workers in
the bottom and the top quantiles are 0% to 15% more likely to start a business than the average
worker whereas in the middle quantile they are 10% - 20% less likely. Therefore, we estimate
entrepreneurial abilities g(✓) = {g1, g2, g3} such that the resulting transition ratios by earning
quantiles in the model are close to their data counterparts.40
Business productivity While preceding papers assuming iid shocks (for instance Mankart
and Rodano (2015) or Herranz, Krasa and Villamil (2015)), the idiosyncratic business shock
we use is characterized by an AR(1) process with variance  z and persistence parameter ⇢z .
In the model, a persistent business shock generates an incentive to exit entrepreneurship (and
search for a job) when an individual falls into a bad state. Therefore, unlike many entrepreneur-
ship models (for instance Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), among others), exit in our model arise
endogenously as an optimal decision. ( z , ⇢z) are pinned down endogenously and capture the
high entrepreneurial exit rate and the fraction of entrepreneurs with zero or negative earnings.
Other parameters After setting the above parameters, other structural parameters have to be
pinned down. The discount factor   helps to generate a realistic annual capital-output ratio of
2.65.41 The return to scale parameter in the entrepreneurial sector ⌫ lets us fit the ratio of median
net worth between workers and entrepreneurs. The probabilities of getting a business idea or a
job opportunity depend on search e orts. Exit probabilities are thus: ⇡e(se) = 1   e e se and
⇡w (sw ) = 1   e w sw . The matching parameters (w ,e), the persistence of the process z and
the search elasticities,  w and  e (with the restriction  w =  e), are used to obtain consistent
masses and transitions between occupations in the model. We target a fraction of entrepreneurs
in the economy of 8.8%, which is close to the CPS estimate and equal to the average observed
rate in the SCF.We target an unemployment rate of 5%, which is roughly theUS average between
2001 and 2008. We target an entrepreneurship exit rate of about 6% and a fraction of (previously
40Notice that we could also take the ratio by educational attainment, however, in the model, there is no state
variable summarizing education exactly. ✓ reflects education, but also experience, professional training, etc.
41As Kitao (2008), we follow Quadrini (2000) and choose a capital-output ratio without taking into account
public capital. Capital in the model refers to equipment and structures, inventories, land and residential structures,
which is 2.65 of total output annually.
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unemployed) new entrepreneurs of 20%, as approximately observed in the CPS. The variance
of the innovation of the process z lets us match a fraction of entrepreneurs with zero or negative
earnings of about 10%, following Hamilton (2000), who uses self-employed individuals and
his own annual entrepreneurial earnings measure and controls for under-reporting using the
SIPP.42 Finally, we let the bankruptcy cost   adjust in order to generate a realistic default rate
of 0.57% following Mankart and Rodano (2015).43 Note that while some parameters mainly
a ect some moments, changing one parameter a ects the whole set of generated moments.
In order to estimate those parameters, we use a simulated method of moments (SMM).44 Let
p represents the vector of parameters to be endogenously estimated. The parameter vector is
chosen to minimize the squared di erence between simulated and empirical moments: pˆ =
argminp
P10
k=1
⇣
mk  mk(p)
⌘2
, wheremk(p) represents the k-th simulated moment andmk its
data counterpart.45 The resulting estimated parameter set and targetedmoments are summarized
in Table 5.46
We find a low value for the discount factor of 0.974. As in other entrepreneurial models (for
instance Cagetti andDeNardi (2006) who find 0.86 to 0.88 at a yearly frequency) the existence of
wealthy entrepreneurs reduce the need to give extra incentives to save through a higher discount
factor to match the capital-output ratio. The implied quarterly lending interest rate, rd + ⌫, is
of 2%.47 For the idiosyncratic business process z , the persistence is 0.87, which is close to
the estimated profit persistency reported in Gschwandtner (2012) (at an annual frequency) and
corresponds approximately to a shock every 2 years.
42Astebro and Chen (2014) report a fraction of self-employed households with zero and negative annual earnings
of 7%. However, they do not distinguish household and individual earnings. Moreover, according to the 2016
Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, 18.5% of businesses with paid-employees experienced a profit loss. Because this
number is subject to a debate, in section G of the online appendix, we recalibrate the model with the arbitrary much
lower fraction of zero or negative earnings of 3% as a robustness check. The qualitative results of the paper remain
unchanged.
43Some papers assume a bankruptcy cost close to 7% according to existing estimation. However, this does not
generate enough bankruptcy in our setting. As shown in section G of the online appendix, models recalibrated
with alternative bankruptcy specifications do not alter the qualitative results of the paper.
44To be more precise, we use a version of the Control Random Search (CRS) algorithm with a set of starting
points generated via Sobol sequences along a dimension of 11 parameters.
45Minimizing this function is computationally intensive since it requires solving policy functions and all equi-
librium outcomes for each set of parameters.
46We also present the resulting policy functions and distributions in the section D of the online appendix.
47This corresponds to an annual interest rate of 8.2%, which is a bit higher than the average lending rate from
1993 to 2008 of 7.44%, as computed by the IMF.
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Parameters Targets
Parameter Symbol Value Moment Target Model
Discount factor   0.9742 Capital-output ratio (annual) 2.65 2.6
Business return to scale ⌫ 0.79 Ratio of net worth E/W 8.0 8.07
Matching parameter e 0.267 Share of entrepreneurs (in %) 8.8 8.8
Matching parameter w 0.855 Entrepreneurial exit rate (in %) 6.0 5.9
Search elasticities  e , w 2.41 Unemployment rate (in %) 5.0 5.0
z process persistence ⇢z 0.869 New entrepreneurs from unemp. (in %) 20 18.9
z process variance  2z 0.185 Entrepreneur with earnings  0 (in %) 10 10.8
Bankruptcy cost   0.0238 Entrepreneurial bankruptcy rate (in %) 0.57 0.57
Entrepreneurial productivity g1 0.0679 W to E flow in quantile Q1 / avg rate (%) 1.075 1.075
Entrepreneurial productivity g2 0.0775 W to E flow in quantile Q2 / avg rate (%) 0.85 0.85
Entrepreneurial productivity g3 0.1026 W to E flow in quantile Q3 / avg rate (%) 1.075 1.075
Table. 5. Endogenously calibrated parameters and targeted moments.
5 Properties of the quantitative model
We now detail the properties of the calibrated quantitative model for occupational mobility
and other moments related to entrepreneurship. Compared to the existing literature on occu-
pational flows, this model better reproduces the aggregate flows while using less exogenous
mechanisms. Here, all flows emerge as the aggregation of optimal decisions to search and exit
to a new occupation, with the exception of the flow from worker to unemployment that we pin
down to the data. The aggregate flows reported in Table 6 are very close to their CPS counter-
parts despite the facts that we are left with one degree of freedom after the calibration and that
the entry of a fraction ⇣ of newborn unemployed agents somewhat disconnects the model masses
from transitional flows.48 In particular, our model captures the fact that unemployed individuals
are 4 to 5 times more likely than workers to start a business. As in the data, the model captures
the high entrepreneurial exit rate into paid-employment. Two forces lead to this high rate. First,
a bad business shock z generates low future expected profits and encourage entrepreneurs to
search a job on-the-business. Second, a sizable fraction of unemployed individuals started their
business out-of-necessity. Since the option to work in the corporate sector is better for those
individuals, they continue to search for a job on-the-business and exit as soon as a job is found.
48As we calibrated the model to match two occupational masses and three transitions, we are left with one degree
of freedom. Theoretically, the invariant distribution of the model flows generates model masses. Therefore, if we
omit ⇣, targetting masses also indirectly target some flows. In the data, there are always some mismatches between
the observed masses and the invariant distribution generated with the observed flows due to the transition to Not
in the Labor Force (NLF), death and various other reasons.
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Masses (%) Flow: Model (Data) (%)
Target Model W E U
W 86.2 86.2 97.36 (97.35) 0.53 (0.50) 2.11 (2.15)
E 8.8 8.8 5.19 (4.80) 94.07 (94.22) 0.74 (0.99)
U 5.0 5.0 45.07 (47.36) 2.14 (2.40) 52.79 (50.25)
Table. 6. Flow between occupations during a quarter (data counterpart between braces). Data sources:
authors’ computations using CPS data from 2001 to 2008. We restrict our sample to individuals aged
between 20 to 65 years old.
In Figure 4, we report how the model matches the shapes of the flows from a given occupa-
tion to another as compared to the CPS data. The flows in the model are computed with respect
to individual productivity (ability) levels and educational attainment is taken as a proxy in the
data.49 In order to compare the alternative definitions of entrepreneurship, we simultaneously
display the flows for self-employed individuals and self-employed business owners. Among
those flow patterns, only the decreasing shape of the paid-employment to unemployment flow
is somewhat more explicitly imposed in the model as we set the layo  probability with a de-
creasing dependence to the ability level ✓. We also recall that we imposed in the calibration step
that the model match the U-shape of the flow between paid-employment and entrepreneurship
by earnings quantiles. The shape of this flow by educational attainment is similarly U-shaped
in the data for self-employed individuals and flatter on the left for self-employed business own-
ers. All the other patterns are endogenously generated by the model. A number of flow shapes
are well-reproduced under our parsimonious assumptions concerning search frictions and busi-
ness shocks across ability groups: we capture the decreasing pattern of the entrepreneurship
to unemployment flow as well as the increasing shape of the reverse flow. We also capture the
hump-shape of the flow from unemployment to paid-employment despite the fact the model is
unable to match the exact magnitude of this flow. This hump-shape is explained in the following
way in the model: low-skilled unemployed individuals search for a job with a lower incentive
than other groups since the di erence of value between employment and unemployment for
this category is smaller. This is not true for unemployed individuals in the high skilled group
49Matching ability groups with education groups might not be the most obvious way to compare data and model
simulations. However, the CPS data does not allow many options on the subject. Although they are probably the
best to recover the flow dynamics at high frequency, CPS data does not provide any information about wealth or
business earnings and unemployment compensation. The included family income variable is rather imprecise and
its range is too small. Education is the best directly available element comparable to the model. However, we still
tried to match by indirect means: in section E of the online appendix, we report flows by reconstructed wages using
a fitted wage that takes age, education, etc.
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although they tend to also switch toward paid-employment less often. But, this group of in-
dividuals has a large incentive to switch toward self-employment, consistently with the data,
lowering the transition to paid-employment. Finally, the flow shape the model captures the least
is the S-shape from entrepreneurship to paid-employment. We still capture the increasing part
of this flow for HS to M groups but not the highly non-linear extremes.50 In the model, high-
skilled entrepreneurs exit more often since they have better outside opportunities in corporate
jobs, without any business risk: this results in a higher incentive to search for a job.51
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Figure 4. Quarterly occupational flows by CPS educational attainment (black, top horizontal axis)
and model ability level ✓ (red, bottom horizontal axis). The solid lines (resp. dashed lines) refer to
self-employed business owners (resp. self-employment only). Legend: U: unemployment, W : paid-
employment, E : entrepreneurship. In grey: confidence interval for the CPS means at a 95% confidence
level. Data sources: authors’ own computations using CPS data from 2001 to 2008.
As argued above, the model is based on the two minimal dimensions of ability and wealth
and individual search e orts play an important role in shaping the flows between occupations.
We find that unemployed agents and entrepreneur’s job search e orts are decreasing both in
wealth and ability.52 For the business search e orts, the policy functions are hump-shaped.
Wealth poor individuals, most likely to be constrained, do not find it interesting to run very
small firms and thus provide very small e ort. As wealth increases, individuals are willing to
50According to the BLS, groups > C and < HS together represent fewer than 15% of the working population.
51In the online appendix sectionA,we show that this S-shape becomes a hump-shaped curve at a yearly frequency
for self-employed business owners. At the higher quarterly frequency, we might also capture movements that may
mainly concern the lowest educated group potentially running more unstable businesses in the short-run.
52For the sake of brevity, the search policy functions of unemployed, workers and entrepreneurs in the baseline
model are plotted in section D of the online appendix.
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invest larger amounts in their businesses and the e ort increases. At some point, search costs
become larger than the benefit of additional capital in the business and search e orts decrease.
We also capture a number of other moments related to the labor market and entrepreneur-
ship that are not explicitly targeted but that are still reasonably well matched. The necessity
share, which is the fraction of entrepreneurs who started businesses because of a lack of job
opportunities is equal to 7.4% in our model and is evaluated by Ali et al. (2008) in 2008 to be
4.7% of early-stage entrepreneurs for men and 21.4% for women, representing 10% in total.53
Therefore, in line with Caliendo and Kritikos (2009), among the 20% new entrepreneurs who
were previously unemployed, a substantial fraction enters entrepreneurship out-of-necessity.
Concerning entrepreneurial earnings, we obtain a fraction of 10.8% of the entrepreneurs
with zero or negative earnings (profits in the model). If we consider only those who do not exit
entrepreneurship at the end of the period, this fraction falls to 9.5%. This means that despite
the realization of bad shocks, a substantial number of entrepreneurs persist in their activity. As
argued by Hamilton (2000) or more recently by Astebro and Chen (2014), a number of en-
trepreneurs (about 35% in the model) create and keep running a business although they would
earn more in a paid job. In the model, expectations of a better business shock z and frictions
induce some entrepreneurs to keep running a bad business while others search for a job op-
portunity and exit as soon as possible. The model generates heterogeneity in entrepreneurial
earnings through di erent firm sizes, ability, and business shocks. The implied Gini coe cient
for entrepreneurial earnings in the model is 0.58 against 0.65 in the SCF. Now considering all
forms of income (including accrued interests from savings and realized profits), the fraction of
entrepreneurs with zero or negative income falls to 2.7% in the model, and between 0 and 2.8%
in the SCF. Finally, concerning the cross-sectional variance of earnings between occupations,
we find a ratio of the standard deviation of entrepreneurial earnings with respect to wage earners
of 3.5 in the model, while it is typically 3 to 4 in the US according to Astebro and Chen (2014).54
The model does also match well the crucial relative wealth between occupations and the
associated saving characteristics. First, it is worth noting that the median ratio of entrepreneurial
net worth relative to the one held by the whole population is equal to 6.2 in the model against 6.6
53We define the necessity share as unemployed agents starting a business while E[W (x)] > E[E (x)] > U(x).
54While the mean and the median ratio of entrepreneurial earnings with respect to wage earners is subject to a
debate, it is recognized that the ratio of standard deviations is high, even controlling for mismeasurement. In the
model, the median ratio of entrepreneur’s earnings (business and wage) over worker’s earnings is equal to 1.5 in
the model, against 1.6 in the SCF, at the household level.
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in the SCF. Additionally, the ratio of median debt to income ranges from 0.95 to 1.6 between
SCF waves, whereas it is 0.93 in our model. Moreover, the median ratio of entrepreneurial
(resp. worker’s) income (including capital gains) to net worth (i.e. total assets minus debt) is
0.11 (resp. 0.63) in the model, while it is 0.13 (resp. 0.68) in the data. Finally, the fraction of
zero (or negative) net worth is roughly 10% in the SCF, whereas it is 4% in our model, and the
fraction of total wealth held by entrepreneurs is 30% in the data, against 29.4% in the model.The
model, however, underestimates the wealth Gini: we find 0.63 compared to 0.82 in the SCF.
However, we do not target this statistic and our model abstracts from a bequest motive, which
has been shown to play an important role in replicating the right tail of the wealth distribution.
Finally, we compare the entrepreneurial survival rate with records available for surviving
establishments. The fraction of entrepreneurs surviving after 2 years and 4 years are respectively
59% and 43% in the model, whereas the average establishment rates are respectively 66% and
44% in the data (see Knaup and Piazza (2007)). However, the empirical data excludes two-thirds
of the observations, as it does not account for sole-proprietorship who might survive less.55
Overall, we potentially underestimate the true survival rate, however, as evidenced by Figure 5,
we capture well the usual shape of the survival rate. That is, the largest exit rates occur during
first and second years and, after the fourth year, the probability of exit is considerably reduced.
In the model, as non-entrepreneurs have no prior knowledge of their business productivity, some
entrepreneurs start with an unfavorable business shock and rapidly exit entrepreneurship.
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Figure 5. Survival rate of new entrepreneurs depending on their previous situation.
Overall, despite the few limitations that we underlined, the model is well suited to capture
55It is worth noting that establishment dynamics might be somewhat di erent from the actual firm and en-
trepreneurial dynamics. As another comparison, using the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED),
Reynolds (2017) finds that 48% of firms survive after 4 years, taking the first transaction as a measure for firm
birth.
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occupational flow dynamics and key features expected from a rich entrepreneurial framework.
6 Policy experiment: self-employment assistance programs
This section studies the introduction of various entrepreneurial assistance programs as an ex-
tension to the existing UI program. For our reference SEA program, denoted SEA⇤, we use the
US UI duration of 26 weeks, corresponding to q¯ = ⇢ = 0.5 and a DRI replacement parameter of
f = 0.3, corresponding to the French PARE case. This SEA policy includes three key features:
type dependency, business income dependency and the option to return to unemployment as an
insured unemployed agent. This policy is compared to two alternative specifications. First, by
setting f = 1, we study a non business income dependent SEA policy, denoted SEANB, closely
resembling the existing US SEAP or the German Bridging Allowance policies. Under this pol-
icy, new entrepreneurs continue to perceive their type dependent UI benefits, irrespectively of
their profit, and can return to the unemployment pool and claim UI in case of failure. Under
the second alternative experiment, denoted SEALS, entrepreneurs receive a periodic lump-sum
amount that is neither type dependent nor business income dependent, as in the German Ex-
istenzgrundungszuschuss start-up subsidy or the UK NEA policy. Here, the DRI parameter
remains at f = 1 but be(✓, ⇡r ) = be .56Additionally, entrepreneurs cannot return to the insured
unemployment situation when stopping their business. All policies are only available to eligi-
ble entrepreneurs. We focus on the e ects of these alternative insurance reforms on production,
unemployment, mobility, entrepreneurial composition, and performances, as well as welfare.
6.1 Steady-state outcomes
Mobility e ects Table 7 reports the aggregate steady-state e ects of the reforms. In all three
experiments, the additional support the SEA scheme provides to early-stage eligible entrepreneurs
leads to significant mobility e ects. The fraction of unemployed individual starting a business
increases between 11 and 19%. Consequently, the fraction of entrepreneurs increases by 1.5%
for SEA⇤ and SEALS and by 2% for SEANB, implying that the number of newly created firms
per year goes up by respectively 2.6, 3.2 and 4.6%.57. Mobility e ects are thus stronger un-
56We assume, as in the German system, that the lump-sum amount is lower than the lowest possible unemploy-
ment benefit such that be = #b(✓1). We arbitrarily set # = 0.9 but adjust the policy duration q¯ in order to generate
the same share of entrepreneurs as in SEA⇤ . We obtain a duration of 1.5 years.
57We normalize this number in the baseline model to 500.000 new businesses creation as in the US. A firm in
the model corresponds to an entrepreneur.
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der SEALS and SEANB, mostly because benefits are provided to entrepreneurs independently of
their business performances under these policies: the systematic support mechanism of these
two policies dominates the downside risk insurance mechanism found in SEA⇤. However, these
experiments select very di erent types of entrepreneurs, both in terms of ability and wealth, as
detailed in the next section. Interestingly, by reducing the bias of the baseline UI system in favor
of paid-employment, all the reforms significantly reduce the fraction of necessity entrepreneurs,
that is to say, entrepreneurs that would have been better o working in the corporate sector. Our
results suggest a decrease of about 20% of the necessity share.
Baseline SEA⇤ SEALS SEANB
DRI replacement rate f - 0.3 1.0 1.0
Type - type-dep lump-sum type-dep
Fraction of entrepreneurs (in %) 8.800 8.929 8.928 8.970
Fraction unemployed starting businesses (in %) 2.144 2.381 2.428 2.544
Entrepreneurship exit rate (in %) 5.934 6.015 6.052 6.105
Insured entrepreneurs over total entrepreneurs (in %) — 2.920 1.595 0.700
Unemployment rate (in %) 5.000 4.992 4.987 4.984
Corporate jobs (in %) 86.200 86.078 86.085 86.046
New firm per year (in thousands) 500 513 516 523
Bankruptcy rate per quarter (in %) 0.569 0.584 0.578 0.581
Necessity share (in %) 7.411 5.886 5.701 5.950
Total production 1.957 1.959 1.958 1.960
Corporate sector capital 3.585 3.582 3.582 3.581
Entrepreneurial sector capital 1.495 1.515 1.509 1.520
Tax rate ⌧w (in %) 0.902 0.921 0.919 0.927
Consumption equivalent variation (cev⇤) (in %) — 0.061 0.066 0.088
Table. 7. Summary statistics: steady-states outcomes.
Unemployment, production, and prices In contrast to the empirical literature (see among
other Caliendo and Künn (2011), Ejrnæs and Hochguertel (2014) or Hombert et al. (2017)) that
studies country-specific SEA policies in partial equilibrium without endogenous occupational
choices, we do not find significant e ects on the unemployment rate. In the model, the response
of the unemployment rate to the reforms is determined by the magnitude of two opposing forces.
On the one hand, a positive change in the expected value of being an entrepreneur relative to
the value of being a worker leads to a shift in the cuto  point along the two-dimensions of
assets and abilities at which unemployed individuals start businesses. This leads to the entry
of new entrepreneurs and an increase in the search e ort to find a business idea, with both
e ects reducing either unemployment or corporate employment. On the other hand, the policy
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also improves the value of staying unemployed and lowers the incentive to search for a job,
potentially leading to an increase in unemployment. Our results tend to show that overall the
reforms encourage unemployed individuals to exit unemployment, but this is mostly detrimental
to corporate jobs. Finally, the e ects on production and prices are relatively small, in part
because the increased capital invested in the entrepreneurial sector crowd out capital invested in
the corporate sector and because the targeted unemployed population is a relatively small group.
Steady-state welfare and costs Interestingly, implementing any of the SEA programs im-
prove the steady-state welfare measured in terms of ex ante consumption equivalent variations
(cev ⇤), despite the higher labor income taxes (labor income taxes increase between 1.8% and
2.7%).58 This is explained by the fact that eligible entrepreneurs are much better o  under the
policies since they obtain a minimum income level with SEANB and SEALS or are directly in-
sured against the downside risk under SEA⇤. Moreover, insured unemployed individuals also
directly benefit from the policies, but welfare gains mostly go to those with su cient wealth to
run a valuable business. On the other hand, costs are small and spread widely among the masses
of corporate workers and unemployed. The steady-state welfare is higher with SEALS than with
SEA⇤ but the largest gain comes from SEANB, where benefits are the highest irrespectively of
the business outcomes, even if this policy is more expensive.
6.2 Selection e ects
Selection by ability To understand this selection mechanism and the change in the composi-
tion of the pool of entrepreneurs, the crucial element is whether or not the reform induces the
entry of low-skilled entrepreneurs. Since regular UI benefits are proportional to the working
ability, highly productive workers receive higher UI compensation when laid o  than those with
low productivity. Therefore, the insurance mechanism generated by the compensation be(✓, ⇡r )
in the two experiments SEA⇤ and SEANB are type-dependent. Contrastingly, SEALS provides
an additional amount of income that is unrelated to previous earnings and entrepreneurs cannot
recover UI rights in case of failure. This policy is thus fully independent of an agent’s ability ✓.
Contingent on whether they are type dependent or not, very di erent entrepreneurs are likely to
be selected by the policies. Table 8 displays the increase in the share of entrepreneurs by ability
58Ex ante cev⇤ computes the constant percentage change in per period consumption, c , that equates the dis-
counted expected sum of lifetime utility under the baseline economy and under the reform. It measures whether
an agent, taking into account all the uncertainty, would rather be born in an economy with or without the reform.
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groups for each policy in simple di erences to the baseline economy.
Ability ✓1 ✓2 ✓3
SEA⇤ +0.131 +0.125 +0.136
SEANB +0.166 +0.165 +0.183
SEALS +0.199 +0.112 +0.089
Table. 8. Increase (relative to the baseline economy) in the share of entrepreneurs by ability groups.
Qualitatively, results can be stated as follows: type-dependent policies favor the entry of
more able entrepreneurs while a lump-sum SEA program encourages the entry of low-skilled
individuals. Because they have to give up on relatively high UI benefits, highly skilled unem-
ployed individuals are less likely to enter entrepreneurship under SEALS as compared to other
reforms. Indeed, the lump-sum amount be is too low to resorb the opportunity cost coming from
the loss of their original UI benefits for this population.59 These composition e ects could also
be related to incumbent entrepreneurs by maintaining the activity of those who would have left
without the reforms. Figure 6 shows that entry e ects are undoubtedly a driver of the results.
Highly-skilled (resp. low-skilled) unemployed individuals are more likely (resp. less likely)
to start a business under both type-dependent reforms and less likely to take a job opportu-
nity, while under SEALS the selection into entrepreneurship is closer to what is observed in the
baseline economy.
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Figure 6. Flows (relative to the average transition rate) from unemployment toward paid-employment
and entrepreneurship by ability group.
59Our findings corroborate results in the empirical literature. In Germany, the 2003 start-up subsidy is similar
to a lump-sum SEA and has been shown to significantly increase the entry of unemployed individuals into en-
trepreneurship, especially for lowly educated individuals (see Caliendo and Künn (2011)). Additionally, Hombert
et al. (2017) show that the DRI introduced in France in 2002 - 2003 did not lower the quality of new entrepreneurs,
especially in terms of education. Finally, in Table 2 of Caliendo et al. (2015), the selection by education in a
type-dependent SEA policy implemented in Germany after 2006 is also found to have more homogenous e ects.
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Selection by wealth Turning to the wealth distribution, the e ects mirror the observations
made by ability. The left panel of Figure 7 displays the di erence in the mass of entrepreneurs
with respect to the baseline case under both SEA⇤ and SEALS. Compared to a lump-sum SEA,
the steady-state distribution under the type-dependent policy has richer entrepreneurs. These in-
dividuals are more likely to run bigger businesses and increase aggregate production. Contrast-
ingly, the small increase in the leftmost bin shows that even under this assistance mechanisms,
financial constraints prevent very poor individuals from running valuable businesses. The right
panel of Figure 7 demonstrates that both policies lead to a significant and similar reduction
in the necessity share. By removing part of the bias generated by the current UI system, the
SEA reforms magnify the value of being an entrepreneur and reduce the number of unemployed
individuals entering entrepreneurship due to a lack of job opportunities.
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Figure 7. Di erence in themass of entrepreneurs (left panel) and the necessity share (right panel) relative
to the baseline economy for the SEA⇤ and SEALS reforms.
Selection and performances A natural question when implementing a program fostering en-
trepreneurship is how eligible new entrepreneurs perform under the policies. In particular, as
pointed out by Caliendo and Künn (2011), these entrepreneurs could have entered and per-
formed similarly without the reform, resulting in important deadweight losses. These losses
are even stronger if the reforms generate moral hazard e ects and reduce the incentives to run
and expand a business. These e ects are usually hard to estimate empirically. We use our
model to evaluate the performance of eligible entrepreneurs on production, invested capital,
bankruptcy rate, skills, and survival rate, in the quarters and years after their entry under SEA⇤
and SEALS as compared to the same group under the baseline economy. We, therefore, separate
new entrepreneurs into two groups: (i) the intensive margin group (IMG) composed of those
37
who would have entered entrepreneurship even without the reforms, (ii) an extensive margin
group (EMG) with those who started a business essentially because the program was available.
The IMG lets us compare the performances and behaviors implied by the reforms relative to
the baseline economy, without selection e ects: we mark individuals becoming entrepreneurs
in the baseline economy, before providing them with each reform and measuring their average
performances. The EMG sheds light on the performance of new eligible entrepreneurs that en-
tered due to the reforms. In the model, the share of recipients who would have started a new
business even in the absence of the policy is 69% under SEA⇤ and 64% under SEALS.60 Table
9 summarizes the average performances of both groups over 5 years.
The IMG shows a reduction in the average capital invested, resulting in lower production
and accumulated wealth over the five years. This is indicative of a moral hazard issue. That
e ect is stronger under SEALS for two reasons. First, that policy provides a minimum amount
of benefits irrespectively of the business performance, resulting in a lower incentive to invest in
the business. Second, it provides benefits for a longer period as compared to SEA⇤, reinforcing
the first e ect. However, since the latter policy allows entrepreneurs to claim their remaining
UI benefits in case of business failure, recipients tend to bankrupt more often.
5 years average Baseline Intensive margin group Extensive margin group
SEA⇤ SEALS SEA⇤ SEALS
g(✓) (skill) 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.083 0.078
Wealth 12.063 12.050 11.626 10.081 8.094
Production 0.825 0.812 0.786 0.821 0.654
Capital invested 12.699 12.466 12.149 11.522 9.339
Bankruptcy rate (in %) 1.006 1.174 0.872 2.326 1.478
Marginal productivity of labor (MPL) 0.298 0.302 0.292 0.370 0.292
Table. 9. Performance and quality of entrepreneurs after 5 years for the intensive vs. extensive margin
groups. Notes: all values are an average over 5 years.
Concerning the EMG, SEA⇤ selects higher skilled and richer unemployed individuals than
the SEALS, and this persists over the 5 years. This is similar to our previous observation. The
resulting average production under SEA⇤ is close to the baseline case and 26% higher than un-
der SEALS. Because this increased entrepreneurial production does not necessarily mean higher
aggregate production, we compute the (virtual) average marginal productivity of labor (MPL)
that translates the marginal production that an additional worker in each considered group would
60While hard to measure empirically, our numbers seem to be comparable to those estimated in the empirical
literature according to Caliendo (2016) who reports a fraction between 20% and 60% depending on the country.
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have generated if she was employed in the corporate sector.61 We find that the corporate produc-
tion loss implied by the entry of more skilled individuals under the SEA⇤ is largely compensated
by the increased production of those individuals in the entrepreneurial production sector.
Finally, figure 8 depicts the survival rate of entrepreneurs in the IMG (left panel) and the
EMG (right panel). Entrepreneurs in the IMG are significantly more likely to survive as com-
pared to the same group in the baseline economy. On the other hand, an average of about 20%
of the EMG survives after 5 years. In the end, both policies are able to foster a number of
long-lasting businesses.
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Figure 8. Survival rate for the IMG (left panel) and the EMG (right panel).
6.3 Insurance e ects and the UI system
SEA decomposition Three reasons explain why insured unemployed individuals would not
start a business in the model: it requires some business search e ort costly in terms of utility;
it is risky, and; it implies losing UI benefits. To support unemployed individuals in starting
businesses, the SEA⇤ combines three insurance components: (1) in case of business failure,
the option of claiming any outstanding UI rights after returning to the unemployment pool; (2)
a compensation that guarantees at least UI benefits in case of low but positive entrepreneurial
income; (3) the provision of a supplementary income that, depending on f , can let them earn
more than their initial UI rights. In Table 10, we disentangle the various components of this
insurance policy by inspecting the e ects of two alternative partial entrepreneurial insurances.
Provided they were unemployed with UI rights before, the first insurance only lets entrepreneurs
return to the unemployment pool if necessary and keep claiming any outstanding UI rights. As
this insurance does not pay any compensation or supplement, we call it the 0-compensation
61We abstract from the additional production coming from the entrepreneur’s wealth that would have been also
invested in the corporate sector, especially since it represents a very small amount.
39
case. The second partial insurance is simply a SEA with f = 0: the supplementary income part
is removed.62
SEA policy
SEA⇤ f = 0 0-compensation
( %) Fraction entrepreneurs 1.48 1.37 0.59
( %) Fraction unemployed -0.16 -0.14 0.02
( %) Fraction unemployed! new business 11.2 10.0 8.3
( %) Tax rate ⌧w 2.09 2.05 0.5
Consumption equivalent variation (cev⇤) (in %) 0.061 0.053 0.021
Table. 10. E ect of the entrepreneurial insurance policy under SEA ⇤ and two partial insurances with
respect to the baseline. Note: ( %) means deviation in percent from the baseline case.
Under both partial insurances, the fraction of entrepreneurs and the fraction of unemployed
individuals starting a new business increase significantly. Obviously, the e ects are smaller in
the 0-compensation case: the fraction of unemployed individuals starting businesses increases
by 8.3% relative to the baseline, against 11.2% with the compensation. In the f = 0 case, the
government does not provide any extra supplementary assistance when the business income is
above UI benefits: this same fraction goes up by 10% and the share of entrepreneurs is reduced
only by 0.11%. Therefore, this subsidy part does not play a crucial role in the total e ect. It
is rather the insurance compensation component and the right to claim UI benefits after re-
turning to the unemployment pool that make the SEA ⇤ e ective. In particular, we stress that
allowing entrepreneurs to return to the unemployment pool and keep claiming UI rights is a
substantially beneficial policy for resorbing the distortion generated by a UI system favoring
paid-employment, with virtually no costs. This single component accounts for 40% of the in-
crease in the share of entrepreneurs under the SEA ⇤, with significant occupational mobility.
The role of the UI system The specification of UI programs itself can change. For instance,
the US experienced several such reforms, especially during recessions.63 We now study the
interplay between alternative UI systems and the provision of SEA. In the model, both the dura-
tion of UI and the level of benefits directly a ect the decision to start a business. First, the more
generous the UI system (i.e. longer duration or larger benefits), the lower the incentive to exit
unemployment (reflected in lower search e orts). Second, the more generous the UI system,
62This is close to the Finnish and Dutch SEA, where business income is fully deducted from UI benefits.
63As an example, in late 2009, the UI duration was extended several times beyond the normal 26 weeks, up to a
maximum of 99 weeks. Such a reform usually has a controversial e ect on the unemployment rate by potentially
lowering the incentive to search for a job. Here, we argue that it could also largely impact the share of entrepreneurs.
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the higher the opportunity cost of starting a business, since previously unemployed new en-
trepreneurs have to give up larger UI claims, reinforcing the bias for paid-employment. Third,
a more generous UI system lets unemployed individuals accumulate more wealth in order to
start their own business.64 This last e ect goes in the opposite direction to the other two but
our quantitative results suggest that incentive e ects dominate the wealth channel. Table 11
reports the impact of alternative UI systems on occupational decisions: (1) variations of the UI
(⇢) and SEA (q¯) durations from 26 weeks to either one year or 99 weeks; (2) variations of the
replacement rate (µ) from 40% to either 60% or 80%.65
Baseline Extended UI duration Increased UI benefits
(⇢ or q¯,µ) (0.5, 0.4) (0.25, 0.4) (0.132, 0.4) (0.5, 0.6) (0.5, 0.8)
— Ini. SEA ⇤ Ini. SEA ⇤ Ini. SEA ⇤ Ini. SEA ⇤
Frac. of entrepreneurs (%) 8.8 8.63 8.86 8.49 8.96 8.6 8.80 8.41 8.68
- % increase — — 2.57 — 4.20 — 2.2 — 3.2
- % insured — — 5.46 — 8.50 — 2.81 — 2.82
Frac. of unemployed (%) 5.0 5.19 5.17 5.38 5.36 5.09 5.07 5.18 5.15
Frac. of workers (%) 86.2 86.18 85.97 86.13 85.68 86.31 86.13 86.41 86.17
Frac. of U! E (%) 2.14 1.98 2.25 1.84 2.16 2.08 2.39 2.03 2.43
Frac. of U!W (%) 45.07 43.49 43.32 41.91 41.73 44.36 44.16 43.63 43.39
Total production 1.957 1.949 1.955 1.943 1.954 1.949 1.953 1.942 1.948
Labor income tax (%) 0.902 1.133 1.173 1.311 1.381 1.362 1.391 1.827 1.870
Welfare gains (cev⇤) — — 0.115 — 0.182 — 0.096 — 0.139
Table. 11. E ects of alternative UI systems with and without SEA ⇤ . Ini. is the baseline economy
without the SEA policy but with the considered change to the UI system.
When the UI duration is extended, most of the resulting unemployment rate increase is
compensated by a smaller entrepreneurial fraction while corporate jobs are only very slightly
reduced. On top of that, starting a business is also riskier, since it means giving up larger
outstanding UI benefits while business profits are still uncertain. Consequently, the number
of newly created firms and production are also reduced. Alternatively, increasing UI benefits
produces a somewhat di erent e ect: while the unemployment rate increases and the fraction
64There are also general equilibrium e ects, such as increased taxes andwages, but our quantitative investigations
suggest that those e ects are small because unemployed agents account for a small share of the population.
6526 weeks correspond to a ⇢ and a q¯ set at 0.5 while a year is 0.25 and 99 weeks is 0.132. More generous
UI systems sometimes lead to W (a, ✓, y , e) < U(a, ✓, e, i) for low values of y . We still assume that an insured
unemployed individual receiving a job o er switch to paid-employment. This could reflect the fact that they can
not refuse a job o er, otherwise, they lose their UI rights and get U(a, ✓, e, n) < W (a, ✓, y , e). Notice also that
Ey [W (a, ✓, y , e)] > U(a, ✓, e, i), therefore, they still search a job with high intensity. Alternatively, we could let
agents refuse some o ers, and the unemployment rate would be even larger under a very generous UI system. For
simple comparison with the benchmark results, we do not explore this issue.
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of entrepreneurs is reduced, the share of corporate jobs increases. Indeed, higher UI benefits
considerably improve the value of having a job relative to creating a business, compelling the
poorest entrepreneurs into stopping their activity to search for a job. The incentives to exit
unemployment are still high as the UI duration remains at 26 weeks. In the end, production is
lower as there are fewer entrepreneurial firms. Under both reforms, taxes considerably increase.
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Figure 9. E ects of a more generous UI system on the entrepreneurship rate, with/without SEA⇤ .
When the SEA is implemented, entrepreneurship, occupational mobility, and production
are strongly increased as the UI system becomes more generous. Indeed, because the distor-
tion arising from favoring paid-employment becomes stronger, the larger is the e ectiveness
of the SEA. Figure 9 demonstrates the interplay between the UI design and the SEA imple-
mentation. Starting from a duration of 20 weeks, increasing the UI duration (right panel) first
reduces the entrepreneurship rate: at this stage, the value of unemployment (and indirectly the
value of employment) is increased more than the value of entrepreneurship. However, if the UI
duration is increased further, the entrepreneurship rate starts rising: the insurance value pro-
vided by the SEA over this longer period increases the value of entrepreneurship enough to
compensate for the increase in the value of unemployment. This specific interaction does not
appear when increasing the replacement rate as evidenced by the left panel of this Figure: the
entrepreneurship rate is decreasing monotonically in that case even under the SEA. This sug-
gests that more than the amount of insurance, it is the possibility of obtaining a regular amount
over a longer duration that matters the most for entry into entrepreneurship.66 Those conclu-
66The empirical literature also seems to support the larger impact of a SEA on occupational decisions when UI
is more generous. For instance, taking the case of France that has a specially more generous UI duration of 3 years
(around 156 weeks), we find that SEA ⇤ implies an increase of 6% of the share of entrepreneurs and around 11%
of the entrepreneurs are insured (against 1.5% and 3% in the baseline). This corroborates the finding of Hombert
et al. (2017) on the large magnitude of the DRI in France, with an increase of about 12% of the number of newly
created firms. The di erence can also be accounted for by a much larger unemployment rate in France as well as
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sions remain valid even when we do not adjust for labor income taxes. In that case, government
spendings are not balanced, which lowers the value of working in the corporate sector relative
to a self-employment situation. Finally, in line with the findings above, implementing a SEA
program under the considered UI reforms largely enhances steady-state welfare.
6.4 Transitional dynamics and robustness
As it is standard in the literature with policy experiments, we compute the transition path of
the economy between steady states, following a sudden and unexpected introduction of the re-
forms. Figure 10 depicts the dynamics. At the time of the reform, the share of entrepreneurs and
labor income taxes sharply rise under all the considered reforms, while the number of corporate
jobs and the unemployment rate are reduced. After 5 years, 60% of the occupational adjust-
ment has taken place under SEALS against 47% under SEA⇤, and production has increased in
all reforms.
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Figure 10. Transitional dynamics after an unexpected introduction of the policies.
Welfare along the transition We quantify welfare gains and losses along the transition as the
ex post consumption equivalent variation (cevi ): it quantifies whether individuals alive at the
time of the reforms and with perfect knowledge about the future would prefer experiencing them
or not. Table 12 summarizes the results for SEA⇤, SEANB, SEALS and the 0-compensation case.
Welfare along the transition mirrors the steady-state findings. Under all reforms, richer individ-
uals (and the least constrained to start a business) are better-o . Concerning ability, it appears
a larger UI replacement rate.
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that SEALS favors much more the low-skilled individuals, while type-dependent SEA impacts
all three ability levels in a similar way, with a slight advantage for the high-skilled. Under all
reforms, workers who su er from higher taxes are less likely to support the reforms. Interest-
ingly, because they disfavor poor and constrained individuals with larger marginal propensity
to consume, the reforms do not appear to be supported by a majority. Nevertheless, the 0-
compensation and the SEALS cases, that benefits more to the (on average poorer) unskilled
group, are better accepted. Overall, relative to steady-state welfare, transitional welfare gains
and losses are quite small.
Type Ability dependent Lump-sum
SEA⇤ SEANB 0-compensation SEALS
Median wealth med. >med. med. >med. med. >med. med. >med.
Occupation
Worker -0.016 0.002 -0.024 0.011 -0.007 0.001 -0.016 0.012
Entrepreneur -0.012 0.007 -0.017 0.014 -0.005 0.003 -0.010 0.015
Unemployed -0.016 0.006 -0.024 0.020 -0.007 0.002 -0.016 0.020
All -0.016 0.003 -0.024 0.012 -0.007 0.001 -0.016 0.013
Ability (✓)
Low-skilled -0.017 0.004 -0.027 0.012 -0.008 0.003 -0.017 0.026
Middle-skilled -0.016 0.002 -0.024 0.009 -0.007 0.001 -0.016 0.012
High-skilled -0.011 0.005 -0.014 0.014 -0.003 0.001 -0.009 0.010
All -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002
Fraction (in %) cevi > 0 29.2 37.5 37.1 41.4
Table. 12. Welfare over the transition (in %cevi ). Note: med. and >med. refer to population masses
below and above the median wealth level in the economy.
Robustness check We also considered alternative model specifications: a broader definition
of entrepreneurship, preventing bankruptcy in equilibrium, an alternative specification of the
business process z and we find that our results are robust to these changes. For the sake of
brevity, we leave the robustness discussions to the online appendix section G.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an incomplete markets heterogeneous agents general equilibrium
model with risky entrepreneurship and search frictions to characterize occupational choices
and occupational flows between entrepreneurship, paid-employment, and unemployment. The
model accounts for the main empirical features about occupational flows, macroeconomic ag-
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gregates and key entrepreneurial features in the US. Both wealth and ability are major determi-
nants of occupational choices and the model matches the magnitude of exits and entries in and
out of occupations with more endogenous incentives than the literature. We extend our baseline
economy to simulate a number of large scaleALMPdesigned to foster entrepreneurship, referred
to as Self-Employment Assistance programs. The assistance provided under these reforms is
shown to help reduce the bias towards paid-employment of current UI systems in the US and
other countries while producing important shifts in occupational choices. As a consequence, a
type-dependent and a non type-dependent SEA select very di erent new entrepreneurs, with the
former facilitating the entry of (on average richer) higher-skilled individuals. We finally show
that these reforms interplay with the UI system itself and isolate the e ects of extending UI dura-
tion on the share of entrepreneurs. We point out that this model could be used to tackle a number
of related questions. A careful analysis of optimal UI design accounting for entrepreneurship
and SEA programs seems promising for future research. Also, simple experiments suggest that
shocks a ecting both the job destruction and the job finding rates in our model can account for
the observed changes in occupational flows during the Great Recession.
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The online appendix is organized as follows. Section A provides additional facts about
entrepreneurship relative to section 2 of the paper. Section B details the data source and the
associated variables used to construct the flows between occupations, the masses of occupation
and the targeted moments. Section C provides a full characterization of the model and section
D displays the associated policy functions and the resulting stationary distributions. Section
E provides additional properties of the baseline model. The full numerical implementation is
detailed in section F. Finally, the robustness of our results is discussed in section G.
A Facts about entrepreneurship
A.1 Fear of failure
Figure 1 plots the relation between the fear of failure index and the self-employment rate in
the US as evidenced by the data collected by the Global EntrepreneurshipMonitor. This relation
is discussed in section 2.1 of the paper. Additionally, Figure 2 displays the cross-sectional
correlation between the fear of failure index and self-employment rate across countries.
A.2 Entrepreneurial income
Figure 3 shows that entrepreneurial income is not distributed normally but is rather extremely
right-skewed. Most entrepreneurs are concentrated below and around the median income (nor-
malized to unity here) but some of them perform extremely well while others have negative
incomes. Whether we consider business or total income, the main idea is that there are poten-
tially important risks associated with an entrepreneurial occupation.
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Figure 1. Fear of failure index and self-employment rate in the US. Source: Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor and The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The Fear of Failure index measures the 18-64 old
population perceiving good opportunities to start a business while indicating that the fear of failure would
prevent them from doing so. The self-employment rate (over the working population) is the fraction of
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Figure 2. Fear of failure index and self-employment rate across countries.
A.3 Additional occupational flows
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 below provide additional occupational flow evidence from the CPS in
addition to the flow plot provided and discussed in section 2.2 of the paper. Figure 4 considers
the period from 2001 to 2015 and Figure 5 considers the alternative data period 2012-2015 (ex-
cluding the 2009 - 2011 unemployment peak). Figure 6 only considers full-time occupation and
discards part-time occupied households from the characterization. The shapes are quite similar
to the one in the core paper. We notice however that the transition from paid-employment to en-
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Figure 3. Entrepreneurial income normalized with respect to the median. Legend: dashed line refers to
only business income and solid line to all entrepreneurial income. Source: SCF 2007.
trepreneurship is U-shaped in the two dimensions of wage and educational attainment for these
3 figures. Finally, in figure 7 we display the yearly transitions. It appears that when consider-
ing only self-employed business-owners, the S-shape of the transition from entrepreneurship to
paid-employment becomes a hump-shape decreasing only for college graduates. This could be
due to the fact that large movements occur at a high frequency (quarterly frequency), suggesting
that many lower than high-school individuals try to run a business but fail relatively quickly
(before one year). We also did compute these transitions at a monthly frequency. Shapes are
similar to those at a quarterly frequency.
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Figure 4. Quarterly flows from a given occupation to another by educational attainment (black) and wage
earnings (blue), from 2001 to 2015. A dashed lines refer to self-employment only while a solid line to
only self-employed business owners. Data sources: monthly basic CPS.
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Figure 5. Quarterly flows from a given occupation to another by educational attainment (black) and wage
earnings (blue), from 2012 to 2015. A dashed lines refer to self-employment only while a solid line to
only self-employed business owners. Data sources: monthly basic CPS.
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Figure 6. Quarterly flows from a given occupation to another by educational attainment (black) and wage
earnings (blue), restricting to full-time movements. A dashed lines refer to self-employment only while a
solid line to only self-employed business owners. Data sources: monthly basic CPS from 2001 to 2008.
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Figure 7. Yearly flows from a given occupation to another by educational attainment (black) and wage
earnings (blue). A dashed lines refer to self-employment only while a solid line to only self-employed
business owners. Data sources: monthly basic CPS from 2001 to 2015.
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A.4 Yearly occupational flows
Using the CPS, we also compute the yearly occupational flows from 2001 to 2008. Table
1 summarizes the results. As a comparison, Cagetti and De Nardi (2009) obtain a yearly en-
trepreneurial exit rate toward paid-employment of about 22% within their model and a yearly
worker exit rate toward entrepreneurship of about 2.4%. We find quite similar flows using our
definition of an entrepreneur.
W E U
W 94.6 2.2 3.2
E 21.6 76.9 1.5
U 56.0 3.7 40.3
Table. 1. Flows between occupations during a year. Data sources: authors’ computations using CPS
data from 2001 to 2015. We restrict our sample to individuals aged between 20 to 65 years old.
A.5 Flows from entrepreneurship to employment and conversely by activ-
ity sector and education
In Table 2, we detail flows from employment to entrepreneurship and from entrepreneurship
to employment by origin CPS main occupation and educational attainment. The majority of the
lowly educated individuals leaving paid employment for entrepreneurship were occupied in the
production sector or the services sector. We find the same type of flows from entrepreneurship
to paid employment. However, the picture is quite di erent for highly educated individuals: a
majority of the movers originate in the professional and related sector with management activ-
ities coming in second1. Mid education groups such as individuals with a bachelor’s degree or
less than a college degree seem to bridge the gap with more diverse origin sectors. This seems to
suggest that individuals with di erent educational attainments are selected in di erent activity
sectors associated with di erent performances and growth expectations.
1Professional and related occupations refer to engineers, architects, surveyors, mathematical and computer
scientists, teachers, lawyers, judges etc. A complete definition is available in the BLS documentation.
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Employment to entrepreneurship flow (%) <HS HS <C B M >C
Professional and related 1 6 15 29 51 77
Management, business, and financial occupations 6 9 16 29 29 16
Sales and related 9 11 15 18 10 4
Service 25 19 16 6 4 2
Production, maintenance, and repair 40 31 17 6 2 0
Transportation and material moving 10 8 6 2 0 0
Others 9 16 15 10 6 1
Entrepreneurship to employment flow (%) <HS HS <C B M >C
Professional and related 1 4 11 19 35 72
Management, business, and financial occupations 16 22 24 33 35 17
Sales and related 10 15 19 24 16 5
Service 24 16 17 7 4 1
Production, maintenance, and repair 31 25 16 8 5 3
Transportation and material moving 11 7 3 2 2 1
Others 7 11 10 6 5 2
Table. 2. Flows from employment to entrepreneurship and from entrepreneurship to employment by
origin sector educational attainment. Data sources: authors’ own computations using CPS data from
2001 to 2008, defining entrepreneurs as self-employed business owners. Category "others" refers to
individuals meeting no other condition and o ce and administrative support.
B Data: additional elements
In this section, we detail additional elements about our sample selection. The main discus-
sion about data elements is conducted in section 2 and Appendix A of the core paper.
B.1 Current Population Survey: sample details
We use the CPS from 2001 to 2008 to compute masses and transitions between occupations.
We restrict our sample to the population aged between 20 and 65 years old. Quarterly probability
to exit a given occupation to another one is computed using all months from 2001 to 2008 in
order to boost sample sizes. We end upwith a panel of around 7millions of matched individuals.
In order to control for false matches, we construct a specific individual identifier that controls
for age, sex and US state. Probabilities are multiplied by the first-month respondent weight
(PWCMPWG) to generate a numeric value for the fraction of individuals in a specific occupation
leaving to another occupation. Finally, we take the weekly earnings as a measure of wage.
Worker We classify as a worker an individual who currently work in a job or who declares
being temporarily absent from a job (PEMLR = 1 or 2, and PEIO1COW = 1:5 or 8).
9
Unemployed individual Individuals classified as unemployed are those who do not have a job,
but have actively looked for one in the preceding 4 weeks (except for temporary illness), and are
currently available for work. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), actively look-
ing for work may consist in contacting an employer, a university or an employment center (job
interviews, submitting resumes, answering job advertisements, checking unions or professional
registers, etc.). Workers expecting to be recalled from temporary layo s are counted as unem-
ployed whether or not they have engaged in a specific job seeking activity (PEMLR = 3 or 4).
We also count as unemployed all individuals marginally attached to the labor force. Those in-
dividuals declare wanting a job (PRWNTJOB = 1), are currently available for work (PEDWAVL
= 1), have looked for a job in the last 12 months (even if they did not actively search in the 4
weeks preceding the interview for various reasons) (PRJOBSEA = 1, 2 or 3). Such individuals
are likely to be represented in our model, since we account for individuals that could search a
relatively small amount of time, which may classify them as not in the labor force following the
BLS definition.
Entrepreneur In the case of an entrepreneur, we use a definition similar to Cagetti andDeNardi
(2006). Using the CPS, we define an entrepreneur as a self-employed (incorporated or unincor-
porated) worker (PEIO1COW = 6 or 7), who currently work (PEMLR = 1 or 2) and own his
business (HUBUS = 1). We control business ownership by creating a specific variable that in-
dicates whether or not the individual was owning his firm from 2001 to 2008, allowing us to
control for measurement errors arising in the survey2. The share of entrepreneurs varies between
8.5% to 11% (relative to the population of workers, entrepreneurs and unemployed) depending
of the assumption considered and the period.
B.2 Survey of Consumer Finance
We use the SCF 2001, 2004 and 2007 waves in order to compute various moments relative
to entrepreneurship. To be consistent with our CPS sample, we restrict the definition of an
entrepreneur to individuals declaring being self-employed and owning a business (that they
2If we do not construct this additional variable, the flow from entrepreneurship to paid-employment during
a quarter jump to 16%, which is inconsistent with yearly flows (see Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)). Therefore,
our definition captures a part of self-employment that is not business ownership, but this is more consistent with
resulting flows.
10
actively work in) with at least 5000$ invested in it3. In table 3, we report those SCF moments
that can be compared to those obtained with the model.
X / SCF 2001 2004 2007 Average Model
Share of entrepreneurs (in %) 8.8 8.5 9.1 8.8 8.8
Fraction of unemployed (in %) 4.2 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.0
Ratio of median net worth (entrepreneur to worker) 7.3 8.7 7.5 7.8 8.1
Ratio of median net worth (entrepreneur to all population) 6.2 7.2 6.6 6.7 6.2
Ratio of median income (entrepreneur to worker) 1.71 1.67 1.57 1.65 1.66
Fraction of pop. with net worth < 1/10 of median (in %) 21.1 22.2 23.43 22.2 15.2
Gini coe cient - wealth 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.63
Fraction of capital hold by entrepreneurs (in %) 28.5 30 31.5 30 29.4
Ratio of median entrepreneurs’ debt to entrepreneurs’ earnings 0.95 1.37 1.59 1.3 0.93
Ratio of median ent. income to ent. net worth (in %) 0.166 0.128 0.11 0.134 0.106
Ratio of median worker income to worker net worth (in %) 0.72 0.73 0.60 0.68 0.63
% of entrepreneurs with zero or negative income (in %) 0.05 0.8 2.8 1.2 2.7
Table. 3. Various moments using di erent SCF waves as compared to the baseline model.
B.3 Part-time versus full-time movements
We display in table 4 the full transition matrix accounting for full and part-time occupations.
We class an individual in a part-time occupation when she is working less than 20 hours per
week. It appears that individuals working part-time are likely to remain in a part-time occupation
(the probability is around 60%). Nonetheless, full-time workers are unlikely to become part-
time workers or entrepreneurs whereas full-time entrepreneurs have a chance to become a part-
time entrepreneurs. This could be driven, for instance, by a lack of production opportunities
forcing entrepreneurs to only work part-time. Overall, the flows of full-time entrepreneurs and
workers do not seem to be a ected when we distinguish part-time and full-time.
Transition (%)
WF WP EF EP U
WF 95.34 2.23 0.39 0.05 1.98
WP 32.99 61.38 0.48 0.74 4.42
EF 4.00 0.32 90.44 4.42 0.82
EP 4.33 3.67 31.34 58.5 2.16
U 39.68 7.67 1.70 0.69 50.25
Table. 4. Flows between occupations for di erent definitions of entrepreneurship per quarter. Data
sources: authors’ own computations using CPS data from 2001 to 2008.
3The magnitude of the moments are quite similar under di erent assumptions for this value. We impose a
restriction of 5000$ to reduce misreporting e ects and to be more consistent with our CPS sample. Moreover,
note that this definition of an entrepreneur selects individuals that are on average better o  than the average of all
self-employed.
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B.4 Not in the labor force (NLF)
In the baseline model, we are computing the flows between three occupations: entrepreneur-
ship, paid-employment and unemployment. We therefore abstract from non-participation. This
assumption might create a bias. Table 5 reports the flows between occupations accounting for
NLF individuals. There are two main observations. First, entrepreneurial and worker flows are
relatively unchanged when we take into account the NLF population. Concerning the unem-
ployment flows, we note that a substantial fraction of unemployed individuals falls into a NLF
status for various reasons (discouragement, not actively searching for a job, not directly avail-
able for work, etc.). At the same time, an important fraction of the NLF population seems to
switch between employment and unemployment. This may indicate that some of them are still
attached to the labor force if an opportunity of work becomes available. This could be due to
recently graduated young individuals or long-run and discouraged unemployed individuals who
finally find a job, without actively looking for it.
Transition (without NLF) Transition (with NLF)
W E U W E U NLF
W 97.35 0.50 2.15 94.17 0.48 2.08 3.27
E 4.8 94.22 0.99 4.62 90.67 0.95 3.76
U 47.36 2.4 50.25 36.61 1.85 38.84 22.70
NLF - - - 8.50 1.08 3.66 86.77
Table. 5. Flows in percentage between occupations during a quarter, taking into account not in the labor
force (NLF) individuals. Data sources: flows computed using the monthly basic CPS from 2001 to 2008.
We restrict our sample to individuals aged between 20 to 65.
C Detailed model characterization
In this section, we provide detailed value functions characterizations to support the more
compact form used in sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 of the core paper. For convenience, we note
W the value function associated with a worker, U with an unemployed individual and E an
entrepreneur. We characterize here the credit status with the superscript e and the insurance
status with the subscript j , except for a worker who is by definition always insured. The future
values of those value functions are respectively noted:
W e0 = W (a0, ✓0, y 0, e 0), Ue0j = U(a
0, ✓0, e 0, j), E e0j = E (a
0, ✓0, z 0, e 0, j)
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As with the simplified notations of the model, the continuation value Ee0j defines the future value
of a new entrepreneur starting a business with insurance status j and credit status e.
Workers Following the notations of the paper, we can write the value function of a worker in
details as follows:
W (a, ✓, y , e) = max
c,a0,se
u(c , 0, se) +  
X
✓02⇥
X
y 02Y
⇡(y 0|y)⇡(✓0|✓)
n
( e=A +   e=C )
h
(1  ⌘)
⇣
⇡e max{W A0, EA0n }+ (1  ⇡e)W A0
⌘
+ ⌘
⇣
⇡e max{UA0i , EA0i }+ (1  ⇡e)UA0i
⌘i
+ (1   ) e=C
h
(1  ⌘)
⇣
⇡e max{W C 0, EC 0n }+ (1  ⇡e)W C 0
⌘
+ ⌘
⇣
⇡e max{UC 0i , EC 0i }+ (1  ⇡e)UC 0i
⌘io
s.t. (2), (3), (4)
Notice that when e = A, then ⇡c(e 0 = A|e = A) = 1. Hence a worker with access to the credit
market remains non excluded next period. In the other case, if e = C , then ⇡c(e 0 = A|e =
C ) =  . The simplified notations combines those probability in the expectation operator.
Unemployed individual Following the notations of the paper, we can write the value function
of an unemployed individual in details as follows:
U(a, ✓, e, j) = max
c,a0,sw ,se
u(c , sw , se) +  
X
✓02⇥
X
y 02Y
⇧y (y
0)⇡(✓0|✓)
n
( e=A +   e=C )
h
⇡w
⇣
(1  ⇡e)W A0 + ⇡eUAj (W ,E )
⌘
+ (1  ⇡w )
⇣
⇡eUAj (U ,E ) + (1  ⇡e)UAj (U)
⌘i
+ (1   ) e=C
h
⇡w
⇣
(1  ⇡e)W C 0 + ⇡eUCj (W ,E )
⌘
+ (1  ⇡w )
⇣
⇡eUCj (U ,E ) + (1  ⇡e)UCj (U)
⌘io
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s.t.
U e0j (W ,E ) = {j=i}
⇣
(1  ⇢)max{W e0, Ee0i }+ ⇢max{W e0, Ee0n }
⌘
+ {j=n} max{W e0, Ee0n }
U e0j (U ,E ) = {j=i}
⇣
(1  ⇢)max{Ue0i , Ee0i }+ ⇢max{Ue0n , Ee0n }
⌘
+ {j=n} max{Ue0n , Ee0n }
U e0j (U) = {j=i}
⇣
(1  ⇢)Ue0i + ⇢Ue0n
⌘
+ {j=i}Ue0n
(6), (7), (3), (4)
With ⇢ the probability that an unemployed individual loses her UI rights next period. The
probability of getting the transitory shock y 0 is given by the invariant probability distribution
⇧y and the shock is known before the decision to take the job.
Non excluded entrepreneur - repayment case
R(a, k , ✓, z , j) = max
c,a0,sw
u(c , sw , 0) +  
X
✓02⇥
X
y 02Y
⇧y (y
0)⇡(✓0|✓)
n
( {j=i}q + {j=n})
⇣
⇡w max{W A0,EA0n }+ (1  ⇡w )max{UA0n ,EA0n }
⌘
+ {j=i}(1  q)
⇣
⇡w max{W A0,EA0i }+ (1  ⇡w )max{UA0i ,EA0i }
⌘o
s.t. (3), (7), (11), (12)
Such an entrepreneur keeps her access to the credit market next period.
Non excluded entrepreneur - bankruptcy case
B(a, k , ✓, z , j) = max
c,a0,sw
u(c , sw , 0) +  
X
✓02⇥
X
y 02Y
⇧y (y
0)⇡(✓0|✓)
n
⇡wW
C 0 + (1  ⇡w )
 
( {j=i}q + {j=n})UC 0n + {j=i}(1  q)UC 0i
 o
s.t. (3), (7), (14), (15)
Such an entrepreneur is excluded from the credit market next period.
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Excluded entrepreneur
Eˆ (a, k , ✓, z , j) = max
c,a0,sw
u(c , sw , 0) +  
X
✓02⇥
X
y 02Y
⇧y (y
0)⇡(✓0|✓)
n
( {j=i}q + {j=n})
⇣
(1   )
h
⇡w max{W C 0,EC 0n }+ (1  ⇡w )max{UC 0n ,EC 0n }
i
+  
h
⇡w max{W A0,EA0n }+ (1  ⇡w )max{UA0n ,EA0n }
i⌘
+ j=i(1  q)
⇣
(1   )
h
⇡w max{W C 0,EC 0i }+ (1  ⇡w )max{UC 0i ,EC 0i }
i
+  
h
⇡w max{W A0,EA0i }+ (1  ⇡w )max{UA0i ,EA0i }
i⌘o
Subject to: (3), (7), (20), (21)
  is the probability to recover the access to the credit market.
D Policy functions and resulting distributions
D.1 Search policy functions
In figure 8 and 9, we report the search policy functions of workers, entrepreneurs and un-
employed individuals generated by the baseline model and discussed in section 5 of the core
paper.
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Figure 8. Business (left) and job (right) optimal search e orts for insured unemployed individuals.
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Figure 9. Workers’ optimal business search e ort (left) and entrepreneurs’ optimal job search e ort
(right). Note: these are optimal policies under the non-exclusion case. For workers we choose y = y3
and for entrepreneurs we take z 1 = z1.
D.2 Endogenous spreads and borrowing constraints
In the baseline model, an entrepreneur will default only when the business shock z is too
small. This is because, in such a case, an entrepreneur generates a small loss and expected future
profits are small. Because the external creditor perfectly anticipates this behavior, it charges a
higher price to risky entrepreneurs, with a higher incentive to default. The resulting interest
rate depends on the entrepreneur’s states. In particular, entrepreneurs with su cient levels of
wealthwould never default. Indeed, for those entrepreneurs, bankruptcy costs (fees and expected
losses from credit market exclusion) are high as compared to the benefits of renegotiating their
debt. The incentive to default is also strongly related to the business shock z 1 realized during
the previous period. Entrepreneurs who experienced a bad shock have a higher probability of
default, lowering their ability to borrow by increasing the charged interest rate.
D.3 Distributions
Figure 11 displays the distribution of the three occupations in the model. As in Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006), distributions display important concentration of wealth in the hand of
entrepreneurs, consistent with the data.
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E Additional properties of the quantitative model
E.1 Occupational flows by wage quintiles, data and model
Figure 12 displays how the baseline model matches the shapes of the flows from a given
occupation to another as compared to CPS data for fitted wages (except for the transition W to
U and W to E where we use exact wages). In the data, information is available for the wages
of employed workers but not for entrepreneurs or unemployed for obvious reasons. Thus we
use a specific methodology to recover this information. We estimate a potential wage that an
individual (i.e. unemployed or entrepreneurs) could have if she would have taken a job. We use
age, age2, age3, sex , education, occupation and industry sector as covariates to fit the observed
log(wage) of a worker in the data. We obtain an R2 of about 0.37 using simple OLS. We then
assign to all the individuals the potential wage using the coe cient estimates. It appears that
educational attainment, that we use as the main proxy for ability in the baseline model, produce
almost the same transitions except for the E to W transition which is now decreasing, a feature
that we do not capture in the model.
E.2 Normalized income of entrepreneurs
Table 6 compares the fraction of entrepreneurs with an income lower than a given level of
normalized income (including wage, business income, and interests from savings) in the model
and in the data. The model exhibits a slightly higher concentration of total income on the left
side with respect to data.
Normalized income level 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Model (% entrepreneurs) 4.6 12.7 25 36 50 66.2 77 83.9
Data (% entrepreneurs) 3.7 9.9 20.9 33 50 63.2 73 79
Table. 6. Fraction of entrepreneurs with an income lower than a given level of normalized income.
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F Numerical implementation
State space and grid definition In our model, an household is fully characterized by a state
vector x = (o, y , ✓, z , e, j , a) with a 2 A, y 2 Y , z 2 Z , ✓ 2 ⇥, o 2 {w , e, u}, e 2 {A,C} and
j 2 {i , n}. We compute the household problem using a grid of asset a of 350 points, spaced
according to an exponential rule. We discretize the process z , y and ✓ with respectively 7, 5 and
3 grid points. We compute the second stage entrepreneur’s problem over a grid of cash-on-hand
with 350 grid points.
F.1 Algorithm
We organize the algorithm as follows.
1. Initialize a full dimension grid space composed of all di erent possible asset values (a),
productivity level (y ), innate ability (✓) and entrepreneurial state (z). The maximum asset
level is chosen su ciently large to get ergodicity of the policy functions.
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2. Guess initial tax rate ⌧w and prices {w , r}.
3. Given prices, solve the consumption-saving-search (CSS) problem of a worker and an
unemployed agent.
4. For the entrepreneur’s problem, we proceed as follows.
• First we solve the CSS problem of the values B , R and Eˆ on a grid of cash-on-hand.
• Given the solution to the previous values, set a grid of possible investment value k
with bound [0, a].
• Separate the problem in multiple regions. Between [0, a], we apply a standard solver
to find the optimal k . Between [a, a], we apply a grid search that account for mul-
tiple solutions that could arise due to the endogenous determination of the spread
rb.
• For each k > a, start by providing the loan at the risk-free interest rate r . If the
entrepreneur default for this interest rate, then compute the resulting new interest
rate rb implied by the zero profit condition of the bank. Iterate the process until rb
is consistent with the default probability. A loan that implies a default probability
equals to 1 is not allowed.
• Save the best solutions to the problem and find the optimal k level.
5. Construct the transition matrix M generated by ⇧y , ⇧z and ⇧✓, a0(x), sw (x), se(x) and
the default decision. Compute the associated stationary measure of individuals  (x), by
first guessing an initial mass of one of households with zero asset and then by iterating
on  0(x) = M (x) until | 0(x)   (x)| < µ, with µ very small.
6. Compute the resulting total asset level, total labor supplied and total investment in the
entrepreneurial sector. Total capital invested in the corporate sector is given as the di er-
ence between total savings and total capital invested in the entrepreneurial sector. Total
labor used in the corporate sector is given by total labor supplied by workers.
7. Update prices {r ,w} using the marginal productivities in the corporate sector and tax rate
⌧w to close the government budget up to a relaxation. Back to step 2 until convergence of
labor income tax rate and prices.
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F.2 Optimal search e orts
We describe here the solution algorithm for computing ex-ante all the optimal search ef-
forts. Given a set of parameter (w ,e , e , w ), the solutions sw and se for each occupation is
computed only once.
In order to pre-compute the search e orts, we set up a very large grid that we call di val
(G V = [0, dmax ]), which summarizes the option values ( V ) of interest, that are needed to
compute either sw or se , as shown above. Given this grid, we solve for the optimal search e orts.
We end up with grid Gw and Ge over optimal search e orts corresponding to values in the grid
G V. When solving for the household problem, we therefore compute  V and we find, using
linear interpolation, the corresponding optimal search e orts sw ( V ) and se( V ).
Worker and entrepreneur search e orts The solution for the optimal search e orts of a
worker and an entrepreneur (who repays) is straightforward and are given respectively by the
first order conditions:
@W (a, ✓, y , e)
@se
= 0
   w (sw ) w +  ⇡0w (sw )
h
⌘max{0, E 0i   U 0i}+ (1  ⌘)max{0, E 0n  W 0}
i
| {z }
 V>0
= 0
@R(a, k , ✓, z , j)
@sw
= 0
   e(se) e +  ⇡0e(se)
h
max{W 0,E 0j 0} max{U 0j 0 ,E 0j 0}
i
| {z }
 V>0
= 0
Unemployed individuals An individual who is currently unemployed can search at the same
time a business idea and a job. A convenient way to rewrite the value function in order to solve
ex-ante the optimal search e orts is to use option values as follows:
U(a, ✓, e, j) = max
c,a0,sw ,se
u(c , sw , se)
+  E✓0,y 0,j 0,e0|✓,y ,j ,e
n
U 0j 0 + ⇡w (W
0   U 0j 0) + ⇡w⇡e max{0, E 0j 0  W 0}
+ (1  ⇡w )⇡e max{0, E 0j 0   U 0j 0}
o
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The job search e ort solves:
@U(a, ✓, e, j)
@sw
= 0
usw +  
h
⇡0w (W
0   U 0j 0) + ⇡0w⇡e max{0, E 0j 0  W 0}  ⇡0w⇡e max{0, E 0j 0   U 0j 0}
i
= 0
and the condition for the business search e ort is:
@U(a, ✓, e, j)
@se
= 0
use +  
h
⇡w⇡
0
e max{0, E 0j 0  W 0}+ (1  ⇡w )⇡0e max{0, E 0j 0   U 0j 0}
i
= 0
Using the notation P(sw ) = ⇡w max{0, E 0j 0   W 0} + (1   ⇡w )max{0, E 0j 0   U 0j 0}, we get the
following condition for the optimal business search e ort:
⇡e(s
⇤
e ) = 1 
 e(s⇤e )
 e
 eP(s¯w )
At the optimal search e ort, the probability of finding a business idea ⇡e(s⇤e ) is decreasing
with the cost of the search  e(s⇤e ) e and increasing with the discount factor  , the matching
parameter e and the value associated of being entrepreneur relative to other occupationsP(s¯w ).
We pre-compute the optimal search e ort s⇤e given  V and sw . We then apply a root-finding
optimizer to search for the corresponding s⇤w within the CSS problem.
F.3 Transitional dynamics
To solve the transition, we compute the solutions of the household problem backward, start-
ing at the new steady-state. We then find prices that are consistent with the implied policies and
we iterate until convergence. We assume that the economy is in the initial steady state in period
0 and the reform is announced and implemented in period 1. Agents did not anticipate the pol-
icy before its implementation. The economy makes a transition to reach the final steady state in
period T . We choose T large enough so that the resulting stationary distribution in period T is
close enough to the post-reform steady states. The algorithm for the transition dynamics is:
1. Guess a path for {L1, ...,LT 1} with Lt = {rt ,wt , ⌧w ,t}. L0 and LT are given by initial
and final steady-states.
2. Use value functions of the final steady state (period T ) to solve the households’ problem
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backwards starting from T   1 until period 1.
3. Use the distribution of the initial steady state and the resulting policy functions to compute
the path of the distribution of household { ˆ(x)1, ...,  ˆ(x)T}.
4. Given these distributions, compute new path {L1, ...,LT 1}. Iterate from step 2 until the
di erence between the initial path is close enough to the resulting path.
5. When convergence is achieved, check if the resulting final distribution  ˆ(x)T is close
enough to the steady-state distribution  (x)T up to a relaxation. If the two distributions
are identical, then stop, else, increase the number of periods T .
F.4 Welfare: computation and additional elements
Between the reformed steady-state and the initial baseline economy, we follow Flodén (2001)
in order to compute the ex-ante utilitarian social welfare change, by computing the premium !V
that measures the percent of life-time consumption that a newborn in the economy A would
need to be indi erent between economy A (without the policy) and B (with the policy).
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Figure 13. Distribution of welfare gains/losses over the transition.
Along the transition, we measures the constant increment in percentage of consumption in
every state that has to be given to each agent so that she is indi erent between remaining in the
benchmark economy and moving to another economy that makes a transition to a new steady-
state implied by the reforms. Figure 13 depicts the welfare gains/losses over the transition for
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four reforms considered in the paper.
G Robustness
Reparameterization using self-employment We have parameterized again the model using
self-employment as the definition for entrepreneurship and assessed the impact of the SEA⇤ in
such an economy. Table 7 summarizes the parameters and the moments of the new calibration.
We target a higher exit rate and a larger fraction of entrepreneurs. We also target a di erent
shape of the transition from paid-employment to entrepreneurship, in line with the data.
A. Parameter Symbol Value
Discount factor   0.9742
z process (autocorrelation, variance) ⇢z , 2z 0.8636, 0.197
Businesses’ return to scale ⌫ 0.79
Search utility parameter  e =  w 2.579
Matching parameter e ,w 0.328,0.842
Bankruptcy cost   0.0275
Entrepreneur’s innate ability [g1, g2, g3] [0.0686, 0.0772, 0.1007]
B. Targeted moments Target Model
Unemployment rate (in %) 5.0 5.0
Share of entrepreneurs (in %) 10.5 10.6
Entrepreneurs’ exit rate (in %) 6.5 - 7.5 7.1
Fraction of new entrepreneurs prev. unemployed (in %) 20 20
Capital-output ratio (annual) 2.65 2.66
Ratio of net worth E/pop 7 - 8 7.6
Bankruptcy rate (as fraction of entrepreneurs) (in %) 0.57 0.58
Fraction of entrepreneur with neg. earnings (in %) 10 10.5
Flows W to E by quantiles / avg rate (%)

Q1 Q2 Q3
1.1 0.85 1.0
  
Q1 Q2 Q3
1.11 0.89 1.0
 
Table. 7. Estimated parameters and targeted moments for the alternative model with self-employment as
entrepreneur’s definition.
Again, the model is able to reproduce the main features concerning the observed transitions.
Table 8 summarizes the aggregate transitions in the model against the data. The magnitudes
found in the model are close to their data counterparts.
Mass (%) Transition: Model (Data) (%)
Target Model W E U
W 84.5 84.4 97.15 (97.20) 0.76 (0.70) 2.09 (2.11)
E 10.5 10.6 6.09 (6.15) 92.93 (92.46) 0.98 (1.40)
U 5.0 5.0 43.88 (46.04) 3.22 (3.72) 52.90 (50.25)
Table. 8. Transition between occupations during a quarter (data counterparts between braces). Data
sources: authors’ computations using CPS data from 2001 to 2008. We restrict our sample to individuals
aged between 20 to 65 years old.
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In table 9, we summarize the results of the model under the SEA⇤ reform. Results are quite
similar to our baseline model but e ects are stronger with all self-employed. Most notably,
the share of entrepreneurs increases by more than 2.1% and the share of insured entrepreneurs
account for 3.3% of all entrepreneurs under the SEA⇤ in this alternative specification, against
1.8% and 2.9% when considering self-employed business owners.
Baseline SEA⇤
(f = 0.3, q¯ = 0.5)
Fraction of entrepreneurs 10.57 10.79
% unemployed starting businesses (in %) 3.22 3.59
entrepreneurship exit rate (in %) 7.07 7.16
unemployment rate (in %) 4.988 4.974
corporate jobs (in %) 84.44 84.23
new firm per year (th.) 500 515.78
necessity share (in %) 8.5 6.7
Entrepreneurial sector production 0.386 0.393
Corporate sector capital 3.58 3.574
Entrepreneurial sector capital 1.729 1.761
Table. 9. The SEA⇤ e ects on aggregates.
Fixed start-up cost Other alternatives, such as implementing a fixed start-up cost had no
significant impact on our numerical results, but of course, the parameterization is di erent.
Notice also that we implicitly already incorporate a start-up cost since an individual has to
search an idea before creating his business. Results with an entry cost suggest that the SEA⇤
leads to a larger increase in the share of entrepreneurs while unemployed individuals are less
likely to create a business as compared to the no-entry cost case. Indeed, imposing an entry cost
reduces the temptation to exit entrepreneurship in case of a bad shock, since individuals would
have to repay the entry cost if they want to recreate a firm.
Bankruptcy specification In the baseline economy, we have assumed that entrepreneurs could
default in equilibrium but are subject to a cost component and a recovery rate. We also explore
the case where no bankruptcy is allowed here. Under this assumption, we obtain a lower flow
from entrepreneurship to unemployment of about 0.39% against 0.74% in the benchmark case
and 0.99% in the data. Policy results are qualitatively unchanged but the magnitude of the SEA⇤
is larger. The policy leads to a 2.2% increase in the share of entrepreneurs against 1.86% in the
benchmark. Indeed, the ability to bankrupt can be viewed as an extra insurance mechanism on
top of the SEA⇤. Removing the option to default implies a larger entrepreneurial risk, which
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increases the e ectiveness of the SEA⇤.
Business shock and fraction of negative entrepreneurial earnings We also conduct some
robustness on the business shock z . We have reduced artificially the variance of the shock to
0.12. The fraction of entrepreneurs with zero or negative earnings falls to 2.7%. Under this
experiment, the e ect of the insurance policy is slightly lowered. This is because even with
low shock z variance, the insurance induces the entry of some unemployed individuals who run
small firms that generate low profits. Under the SEA⇤, such new entrepreneurs are compensated
and receive part of their UI rights in addition to their starting low profit.
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